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This project will firstly set out to argue that relativism is a viable and defensible stance which 
can  be taken up in many contemporary philosophical debates. This will be achieved firstly by 
drafting an overview of the lineage of relativist theories; a pivotal task, due to the fact that there 
is no clear “school” of relativism – as there is in other areas of philosophy. Of course, the 
history of this theory is perhaps more a history of attempts to refute it than anything else. For 
this reason, it will   be crucial to address some of the many concerns that have been voiced 
about the implications of a relativist approach over the years. Once these matters have been 
sufficiently addressed, there will  be solid ground on which this project may build a unique 
moral perspective. Ultimately, it will be  argued that relativism is an available stance within 
moral irrealism and that a moral irrealist relativism would be an attractive position to take up 
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The overarching goal of this project will be to identify the most robust truth value that might 
be ascribed to moral statements, outside of moral absolutism. It will ultimately be argued here 
that the source of a truth value like this can be found in a specific form of relativism, one that 
might be labelled irrealist in nature. However, instead of being thought of as an available – or 
even attractive – position to take up in philosophical debates, relativism has often been 
considered a kind of anti- theory. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, it has been 
doomed to play a role which resembles something of a pantomime villain. One or another 
relativist caricature has been used to represent the anti-philosopher. These figures are often 
faceless, but not always. Plato’s Protagoras is perhaps the clearest example which can be used 
to corroborate these claims. 
Listing the many transgressions which these relativist caricatures have been accused of 
committing in any great detail will be outside the scope of this project. For now, it need only 
be said that they can range anywhere from: doing analysis for the sake only of showing that no 
analysis can be done, to espousing self-refuting nonsense.1 It has even been suggested that 
relativism has dangerous implications and ought to be avoided at all costs.2 At least one version 
of these criticisms will likely be familiar to readers with prior exposure to the topic. Many of 
them can trace their roots back to the argument made by Plato’s Socrates, commonly known 
as the peritrope. The argument goes something like this: if there is no such thing as truth, then 
that claim itself cannot be true. Whilst this argument has enjoyed tremendous support, there 
are ways around it. For example, one need not accept that the relativist wants to claim that there 
is no such thing as truth – on the contrary; ‘the relativist holds that there is lots of truth’ 
(Knorpp, 1998, p. 285). 
This is but one example of the many confusions which have consistently surrounded this topic. 
In order to address said confusions as a whole, it will be crucial to lay out, in detail, the many 
diverse forms relativism can take. The first chapter of this project will therefore be solely 
 
1 Joshua Greene, for example, has referred to “the proverbial relativist” in ethical debates. This imaginary figure 
is someone who, according to Greene, denies that we can ‘make tough choices’, or make ‘trade-offs among 
competing tribal values’ (Greene, 2014, p. 291). Greene’s Proverbial relativist holds that ‘there are different tribes 
with different values, and that's all there is to say’ (ibid., p. 290). 
2 Former Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger has made various arguments along these lines. He considers 
relativism to be a fundamental element of contemporary life, which is, of course, one where the influence of the 
institution he represents is becoming increasingly diminished. According to him, relativism is a “dictatorship” 
which rules our lives. Although he does not do much to define what he means when he uses the term, it is clear 
that for him, it implies many bad things (Stenmark, 2018, p. 180). 
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dedicated to thoroughly answering the question: what is relativism? This will be achieved 
primarily by way of literature review. One can only be open to the idea of a particular relativism 
being an available or even attractive position if they can understand it within the wider context 
of other relativisms. Also, if they can understand what it means for a particular theory to be 
labelled a relativism. Sections 1.1-1.3 will prime readers for some of the arguments made in 
later sections. 
Chapter one will seek to address confusions which have consistently surrounded relativisms, 
whereas chapter two will seek to address some of the anxieties which have been caused by 
them. Broadly speaking, sections 2.1-2.3 will be dedicated to answering the question: how 
worried should we be? Take, for example, the notion of relative truth. The idea that this is 
something about  which we ought to worry would most likely be based on the assumption that 
truth is only valuable  when it is “absolute”. There is no obvious reason to assume that this is 
the case. Although, it might  be argued that absolutist truth is the most robust form of truth 
value – and we ought to strive for a clear idea of what is absolutely true – this is not the only 
available position. 
Jesse Prinz has proposed that we may even be better off without the constraints of a strict 
adherence  to absolutist truth (Prinz, 2011, p. 5). In other words – through relativism, there is 
a way in which  we can make truth work for us. If what is taken to be a moral truth is deemed 
absolute, independent, unchanged by outside factors and so on, there is hardly any room for 
moral progress. By cutting the brakes on moral progress, for example, we may be allowed to 
think of morality as a tool which  can be made to work for us; ‘we can think about what we 
would like that tool to do for us and revise morality accordingly’ (ibid.). It is worth noting that 
there are more moderate formulations of relativism than Prinz’s one very briefly sketched here. 
These arguments may seem a step too far for many, formulating a full defence of them will not 
be possible at this stage. 
There are more moderate relativist propositions which might be more easily shown to be no 
cause for concern. For example, plenty of us would not hesitate to accept “beauty is in the eye 
of the beholder”. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that there are not quite so many who 
would be willing to accept something like the idea that human sacrifice need not be labelled 
“wrong” when cultural context is taken into account. These two positions are not mutually 
exclusive, one can therefore be simultaneously labelled a relativist with respect to beauty and 
an absolutist with respect to human sacrifice. 
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It would, however, be a mistake to not anticipate that critics would likely see this as a 
manoeuvre around the point. Well and good, they might say, you can call me a relativist if I 
believe that beauty  is in the eye of the beholder; but as long as I am fully truth committed with 
respect to morality in  this case, I am an absolutist where it really matters. Such an objection 
would be understandable; problems of aesthetics are rarely, if ever, matters of life and death, 
whereas ethical problems often are. It will therefore be necessary to direct special attention to 
these problems as they pertain to relativism. This will be another goal of chapter two. 
Of course, a meaningful answer to the question “how worried should we be?” will have to be 
based on a relativism, or relativisms, about which people have tended to worry. Moral problems 
and ethical theory in general are one of the more divisive topics with respect to which a 
relativist stance  may be taken. Sections 3.1-3.3 will therefore be focused on moral problems, 
particularly from a metaethical perspective. Of course, this will also serve to set up an attempt 
to achieve the overarching goal of this project. Namely, to deny absolutism and establish what 
exactly the most robust truth value that can be ascribed to moral statements then is. 
In order to achieve this, it will be argued that a relativist stance is available within moral 
irrealism. Different versions of moral irrealism advanced by thinkers generally associated with 
metaethical perspectives, like noncognitivism and expressivism3, will be compared with a 
moral irrealist relativist4 perspective in order to showcase its strengths. The difference between 
M.I.R and other forms of irrealism, it will be argued, is that the former can be labelled a 
descriptivist theory and can therefore hold that moral statements describe, what Terry Horgan 
and Mark Timmons have referred to as ‘way-the-world-might-be content’ (Horgan & 
Timmons, 2006, p. 75). 
  
 
3 For example, one version of the early Wittgenstein, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. 
4 Henceforth abbreviated to M.I.R. 
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Chapter 1: What is Relativism? 
Introduction 
Overall, this chapter will go on to demonstrate that there are several different forms of 
relativism, that it is no one theory and that it is perhaps more accurately referred to a collection 
of related but distinct relativisms. Section 1.1 will sketch an overview of the long past of these 
relativisms with the help of Maria Baghramian (2004-2014). As briefly hinted in the 
introduction to this project, relativism’s long past can be traced as far back as ancient Greece 
in Plato’s Protagoras. However, as per Baghramian, relativist-like arguments can also be 
identified in pre-Socratic thought. Taking the likes of Euripides, Xenophanes and Heraclitus as 
its starting point, 1.1 will review the progression of what Baghramian identifies as early 
relativist thought through Protagoras, on to the enlightenment and right up to the modern era. 
Overall, this will serve to shed some light on a legacy which has, to some extent, remained in 
the dark. The historical context provided by 1.1 will serve as solid foundations for this project 
going forward. 
A number of rigorous efforts to categorise relativisms, where a relativism is understood as an 
instantiation of Susan Haack’s scheme “x is relative to y”, have been made in recent years. 
Prominent examples of these can be found in the work of Martin Kusch and Baghramian  
specifically. Section 1.2 will lay these out in some detail. Baghramian has also come up with a 
helpful method of defining relativisms, which she calls “definition by enumeration”, this will 
be explored in 1.2. Achieving clarity with respect to what relativism is not, is perhaps just as 
important  as understanding all that it can be; for this reason, Section 1.3 will be dedicated to 
some negative definitions put forward by William Max Knorpp and others. This groundwork 
will allow readers to recognise that it is possible to be a relativist in one area and not in another; 




1.1 History of Relativism 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, section 1.2 will go on to lay out the many different 
forms of relativism that exist today. Unlike other philosophical theories, relativism does not 
necessarily have a commonly accepted genealogy. Tracking down the exact origins of each 
strand will likely need its own dedicated project. Said origins are likely as diverse as the 
theories themselves. For this reason, mapping the history of relativism is no easy task. It is one 
which has only recently begun to be undertaken. Speaking to this, Kusch has adapted one 
observation made  by Hermann Ebbinghaus in the early 20th century, with regards to 
psychology in that case, and suggested that relativism has a ‘long past, but a short history’ 
(Kusch, 2019, p. 1). 
One key contributor to this short history is Maria Baghramian, she has worked extensively to 
shine light on the “long past” of relativisms; this is a past which, like many other areas of 
western philosophy, finds its roots in ancient Greece. Herodotus [fifth century B.C.E] argued 
that ‘if people were asked to name the best laws and customs, they would name their own’ 
(Baghramian, 2010, 
p. 32). She also points out that one of Euripides’ plays from that same era featured a character 
who announces that ‘no behaviour is shameful if it does not appear so to those who practice it’ 
(ibid.). Later, Xenophanes [sixth century B.C.E] made the argument that different people have 
different conceptions of God and ‘if cows, horses, and lions had hands, and were able to draw 
with those hands… horses would draw images of gods like horses and cattle like cattle’ (ibid.). 
All that said, Baghramian rightly points out that Protagoras [fifth century B.C.E] is often 
considered the first official representative of relativist views. He famously stated, ‘man is the 
measure of all things: of the things which are that they are, and of the things which are not, that 
they are not’ (ibid., p. 33). Of course, the formation of this perspective was not an isolated 
incident; it could perhaps be seen as the result of increased contact between the ancient Greeks 
and other civilisations. Baghramian suggests the Persian Wars [490 - 480 B.C.E] in particular, 
and the turmoil of which they were a cause, ‘cast doubt over the old certainties and introduced 
the idea that social and ethical rules which had been construed as unchanging, universal or of 
divine origin  were in fact merely transitory and local’ (Baghramian, 2004, p. 16). This, 
however, is not the only factor which set the stage for Protagorean relativism. 
Readers will likely be familiar with attempts made by presocratic philosophers to find ‘all- 
encompassing metaphysical-cum-scientific explanations of the ultimate constituents and 
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principles of the universe’ (ibid., p. 17). It was in their failure to reach a consensus that the 
seeds of Protagorean relativism were sewn. As Baghramian puts it, ‘irresolvable disagreement 
among the natural scientists on the constitutive elements and origins of the universe led to 
disillusionment  with the idea of there being a single unifying account’ (ibid.). In addition to 
this, traces of relativist  ideas can be found in a number of presocratic philosophers that 
preceded Protagoras. Some examples include Euripides and Xenophanes, who have already 
been referred to here. 
One other key example of a presocratic philosopher whose thought shows early traces of 
relativism, and one who is regarded as having a direct influence on Protagoras, is Heraclitus. 
Baghramian has suggested that Plato, Aristotle and others considered this to be the case and, 
according to her, it is in Heraclitus’ doctrine of the unity of opposites and his theory of flux 
that the Protagorean thesis finds its ‘ontological backbone’ (ibid.). Of course, in tracing a 
history of relativism, we are forced to discuss “the Protagorean thesis” in a somewhat general 
sense given the lack of any first-hand account of Protagoras’ thought. This is of course due to 
the fact that, as  Baghramian has also pointed out, ‘almost all our knowledge of Protagoras 
comes to us indirectly through the works of Plato, Aristotle and the later Hellenistic 
philosophers’ – only eleven such fragments of his work survive to this day (ibid., p. 18). 
It will perhaps not come as much of a surprise to learn that attempts to defend relativist  
perspectives are far outnumbered by the converse; ‘the history of relativism is simultaneously 
a history of the attempts to refute it’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 33). The fact that Protagoras, the 
original relativist, survives almost solely in the work of his critics illustrates this claim nicely. 
Chief amongst those critics is Plato who, as per Baghramian, attributes a kind of alethic 
relativism to Protagoras. Baghramian takes alethic relativism to mean, that ‘truth should be 
relativised to a framework or perspective – to Protagoras’ (ibid.). 
The peritrope, Plato’s criticism of Protagoras referred to briefly in the introduction to this 
project, is a key argument in the history of relativism, which is, to reiterate, simultaneously a 
history of anti-relativism. Relativism has often been labelled as self-refuting on the basis of 
arguments which are, more or less, interchangeable with those found in Plato’s Theaetetus. In 
this dialogue, Plato famously concludes, ‘most people believe Protagoras’ doctrine to be false. 
Protagoras believes his doctrine to be true. By his own doctrine, Protagoras must believe that 
his opponent’s view is true. Therefore, Protagoras must believe that his own doctrine is false’ 
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(ibid.). Readers will likely be familiar with this argument, either in its original form or another; 
something like that sketched briefly on page four.5 
One other significant criticism of Protagoras is that of Aristotle. According to him, Protagoras 
was guilty of contravening the law of noncontradiction. This is, in part, due to the fact that he 
is reputed  to have ‘taught his pupils to praise and blame the same things and to find support 
for the weaker arguments and to undermine the stronger ones’ (Baghramian, 2004, p. 19). 
According to Baghramian, it is perhaps also due to the fact that Aristotle would argue – ‘if man 
is the measure of all things, then different people would assign the value true or false to the 
same assertion, rendering it both true and false’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 34). It would then follow 
that the possibility of contradiction itself would be eliminated and, in a similar move to that 
made by Plato’s arguments, Aristotle suggests that ‘the very expression of relativism is 
meaningless since it does not exclude its denial’ (ibid.). 
Evaluating these criticisms fully will be outside the scope of this section; for now, it will be 
enough  to say that the lengths to which Plato and Aristotle went to refute the Protagorean 
thesis speaks to  its significance. As suggested by Alasdair Macintyre, ‘nothing is perhaps a 
surer sign that a doctrine embodies some not to be neglected truth than that in the course of the 
history of philosophy it should have been refuted again and again’ (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 22). 
Despite the high-profile criticisms from Plato and Aristotle, Baghramian notes that the 
influence of the Protagorean thesis ‘survived into the Hellenistic period in the work of the 
Pyrrhonian Sceptics in particular’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 34). Instead of criticising the 
Protagorean thesis, the Sceptics used it to support their views. Baghramian cites the following 
passage from Sextus Empericus, whom she describes as the most influential Pyrrhonian. 
Protagoras has it that human beings are the measure of all things, of those that are that they 
are, and of those that are that they are not. By ‘measure’ he means the standard and by ‘things’, 
objects; so, he is implicitly saying that human beings are the standard for all objects… for this 
reason he posits only what is apparent to each person, and thus introduces relativity. Hence, 
he is thought to  have something in common with the Pyrrhonists (ibid.). 
According to her, Sextus argues that judgements/observations are relative to the person making 
them or the object being observed. 
 
5 Something like, “claiming that there is no truth is itself a truth claim” or, “if it is true that there is no truth, then 
there is no truth cannot be true either”. 
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Nowadays, relativism and scepticism are generally not regarded to be one and the same; 
however, the distinction between them was not always so clear. Relativism and indeed, 
scepticism went through something of a dark period and, according to Baghramian, had been 
ignored for around fifteen centuries until the publication of Outlines of Scepticism in 1562. 
Scepticism and relativism ‘once more became live philosophical topics’ (ibid., p. 36). 
According to Baghramian, it was Michel De Montaigne who provided the ‘the most significant 
link between the relativism and scepticism of the ancients and the various relativistic doctrines 
developed by modern philosophers’ (ibid.). 
Professor of anthropology, Norris Brock Johnson has suggested that ‘during the sixteenth 
century sustained contact with the peoples and sociocultural traditions of the New World and 
Africa altered Euro-Western conceptions, and images, of the human’ (Johnson, 1993, p. 153). 
Montaigne, who has been significantly influential in the field of anthropology surely fits this 
description. Cultural relativism has been and continues to be an important concept in the field 
of Anthropology; Montaigne is considered, by anthropologists, to be a key “purveyor” of this 
concept in his time (ibid.). It is unlikely that Montaigne thought of himself in this light, as 
Baghramian points out, he did not distinguish between scepticism and relativism; let alone, 
between different forms of relativism. ‘He seems to think that the two philosophical attitudes 
are fundamentally the same’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 37). 
Given that some contemporary forms of relativism have condemned the enlightenment ‘for its 
faith in universal norms of rationality’ (ibid.), it may come as a surprise to see Montaigne – 
whose influence on the French Enlightenment is undeniable – associated with relativism. 
However, one need not go to great lengths to discover seemingly relativistic sentiments in his 
writing; in Of Cannibals he claimed, ‘everyone gives the title of barbarism to everything that 
is not in use in his own country’ (Johnson, 1993, p. 158). He is not the only of his 
contemporaries to espouse such views either; Baghramian writes, ‘at least some strands of the 
Enlightenment bear the unmistakable signs of a nascent relativism’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 37). 
Voltaire, Diderot and Montesquieu are amongst the examples she lists. One of the key markers 
of a nascent form of relativism, for her, is any attempt to call for tolerance towards different 
creeds and peoples. 
Diderot, for example, advanced a kind of “exoticism”; he idealized distant cultures in his  
Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville by suggesting that ‘the Tahitian is mild, innocent 
and happy, whereas civilised people are corrupt, vile and wretched’ (ibid.). He opposed efforts 
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to civilise cultures such as these and, as per Baghramian, made the relativistic-sounding 
proposition that one must ‘put on the costume of the country you visit, but keep the suit of 
clothes you will need to go home in’ (ibid.). Similarly, Montesquieu wrote that ‘negroes paint 
the devil sparkling white and their gods black as coal’ and that if ‘triangles had a god, they 
would give it three sides’ (ibid.); this should sound familiar.6 
It appears that at least one form of relativism can find its roots in enlightenment thought, 
namely, cultural relativism as popularised by anthropologists. Similarly, as it has already been 
hinted, the counter-enlightenment of the eighteenth century has proven just as influential to the 
development of relativisms. Thinkers like Johann Georg Hamann proposed that historical 
context is an essential criterion for understanding; he and others ‘opened the way for a 
historicized and situational interpretation of cognitive and moral systems’ (ibid., p. 38). 
Hamann also has been credited with initiating “the great romantic revolt” which, according to 
Baghramian, amounted to a ‘denial that there was an objective order… whether factual or 
normative, from which all knowledge and all values stemmed’ (ibid.). This proved inspirational 
for the likes of Nietzsche and contemporary postmodernism; proponents of which saw 
themselves as opponents of the legacy of the enlightenment. 
Now that an outline of the “long past” of relativism has been sketched, it will be important to 
explore some more contemporary approaches to the topic; this will be task of section 1.2. The 
relativisms outlined there can perhaps be seen take their starting point from the first 
contemporary  use of the term, by John Grote in his Exploratorio Philosophica in the mid-
nineteenth century. Around the same time, ‘William Hamilton advocated what John Stuart Mill 
calls the “doctrine of  relativity of our human knowledge”, according to which there can be no 
unconditional human knowledge’ (ibid. p. 39). 
  
 
6 See p. 8, where the belief that ‘if cows, horses, and lions had hands, and were able to draw with those hands… 




1.2 Positive Definitions 
Relativism has, it is fair to say, been something of a divisive topic throughout the history of 
western philosophy. Michael Krausz, in his contribution to Relativism: A Contemporary 
Anthology, rightly suggests that we should defer the question ‘who is right – the relativist, the 
absolutist, or neither –and first ask, which relativism?’ (Krausz, 2010, p. 30). For, as this 
section will show, ‘relativism is no one doctrine’ (ibid.) and any attempt to tackle it has to take 
clarification of the many diverse  forms of relativism as its starting point. 
There have been a number of projects which have shed valuable light on relativisms, 
understood by many as instantiations of Haack’s scheme – x is relative to y. One especially 
insightful example  is A Primer on Relativism by Martin Kusch. He works from the assumption 
that the y to which any given x is relative varies for different versions of relativism. Kusch 
demonstrates this, using Haack’s scheme, in the following tables. 
“x” stands for Forms of relativism 
1. Objects, properties, facts, worlds, truth(s) Ontological 
2. Classifications, concepts, meanings Semantic 
3. Moral values, norms, commitments, 
justifications 
Moral 
4. Knowledge or epistemic justification Epistemic 
5. Tastes Gustatory 
 
“y” stands for Forms of relativism 
A. Individuals Protagorean 
B. Cultures Cultural 
C. Scientific paradigms Kuhnian 
D. Classes, religions, genders Standpoint 
 
Propositions will be the primary x to which this discussion will refer; this term will, at times, 
be used interchangeably with “judgements” and “statements”. Of course, this does not 
represent every  possible x in Haack’s scheme; one could not, for example, conflate “objects” 
with “propositions”. That said, one could make propositions about objects, what might be 
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called ontological propositions. Similarly, one could make semantic, moral, epistemic and 
gustatory propositions. 
Take the adage “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, this might be considered an expression 
of gustatory Protagorean relativism. That is, because the x in this case, beauty, can be applied 
to the category represented in line 5 of the above table and the y, the beholder, can be applied 
to line A. So, “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is synonymous with “tastes are relative to  
individuals”. Similarly, if one was to consider the phrase “might makes right”, one might be 
led to the conclusion that this could be construed as a relativistic proposition. The x, in this 
case, could be seen as “right” and the y as “might”. This interpretation could then be applied 
to Kusch’s table, where it might be found that “right” is represented by line 3 and “might” is 
represented by line B. Thereby, “might makes right” would be synonymous with “morality is 
relative to culture”. 
There is, no doubt, a near inexhaustible list of similar statements – which either bear the signs 
of nascent relativism like those above or are overtly relativistic in nature and can be easily 
applied to Kusch’s table. Now that it has been established that the subject and object of 
relativist propositions are variable, something will need to be said about the nature of these 
propositions. In other words, what does the link between x and y, “is relative to” mean exactly? 
Finding a satisfactory answer, or answers, to this question will be no easy task. It is perhaps 
the key element of any satisfactory positive definition of relativism. But first, more on x and y. 
Similar work to that of Kusch just presented has also been done by Maria Baghramian. She 
provides her own interpretation of Haack’s scheme in the following tables. 
Objects of Relativisation 
1. Cognitive norms: truth, rationality, logic, justificatory standards (cognitive 
relativism, epistemic relativism, postmodernism, truth relativism) 
2. Moral values (moral relativism) 
3. Aesthetic values (aesthetic relativism) 
4. Knowledge claims, worldviews, ontologies, systems of belief (cognitive, conceptual, 
and epistemic relativism, social constructivism) 
5. Propositions or tokens of utterances (particularly those expressing personal 




Domains of Relativisation  
A. Individual’s viewpoints and preferences (subjectivism, new relativism) 
B. Historical epochs (historicism) 
C. Cultures, social groupings (cultural relativism, social relativism) 
D. Conceptual schemes: languages, theories, frameworks (conceptual relativism, social 
constructivism) 
E. Context of assessment, e.g., taste parameter, assessor’s/agent’s sets of beliefs (new 
relativism, epistemic relativism) 
 
Following this approach, reconsider the example of “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”. In 
Kusch’s table, line 5 was relative to line A; here, line 3 was relative to line A. Both Baghramian 
and Kusch elaborate the categories in their respective tables in detail, both systems represent a 
thorough account of x and y in Haack’s scheme. However, as mentioned above, they do not 
say much about that which links all these objects of relativisation and domains of relativisation, 
as Baghramian calls them. In order to fill in this gap, something will need to be said  about 
what “is relative to” can mean. 
One possible answer to this is that “is relative to” can be used interchangeably with “is 
contingent upon”. So, referring back to Kusch’s table, if one were to propose that line 4 is 
relative to line C, one would be making the epistemic Kuhnian claim that knowledge, or 
epistemic justification, is contingent upon scientific paradigms. Instead of using “contingent 
upon” here, “dependent on”, “conditional upon”, “subject to”, “based on” or “determined by” 
could have been used. All of these phrases used in this context would amount to the same set 
of meaning; that knowledge does exist, nor does it come about, in a vacuum. Anyone who 
might make this proposition would likely hold that anything which we may come to know, x, 
will have been preceded by a paradigm of some sort, y. Thus, x here is contingent upon, or 
dependent on, or conditional upon, or subject to, or based on, or even determined by, y. This 
list may not be exhaustive, but it should do something to demonstrate what can be meant by 
the phrase “is relative to” in this discussion. 
Kusch and Baghramian’s tables combined with the above clarification, broadly speaking, 
demonstrate that ‘relativism does not stand for a unified doctrine with more or less discrete 
boundaries or intellectual genealogy’ (Baghramian, 2004, p. 62). Perhaps the only thing that 
might properly be considered in common between two relativist theories is that which links 
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their respective objects and domains of relativisation together. It has also been contended that 
one can be a relativist in one domain and not in another. For example, one might make the 
historicist proposition that, referring back to Baghramian’s table, x is relative to line B but also 
reject the subjectivist proposition that x is relative to line A. For now, this will be assumed 
possible. In doing so, there is the potential for an impasse. It might be asked, is the relativist 
not subject to coherence commitments? How is it that they can be allowed to pick and choose 
when to defend relativism and when to shy away from doing so?7 These concerns and many 
others will be addressed in chapter two. The purpose of this chapter is simply to lay out and 
contextualise some of the many possible definitions of this theory in detail. 
These definitions, alongside the historical context given at the outset, will serve as pieces of a 
puzzle which ought to be completed before tackling some of the questions posed by later parts 
of  this discussion. Also, as it will be suggested in chapter two, many criticisms of relativism 
have not  been specific about which relativism we ought to be worried. Familiarity with the 
definitions laid  out here should allow readers to accurately decipher exactly which relativism 
is the subject of criticisms which they may encounter. Subsequently, it may be deduced whether 
said criticisms are  genuine and the particular form of relativism to which they are referring 
ought to be avoided; or whether said criticisms are simply a scare mongering tactic in order to 
bolster some other set of arguments.8 The methods of defining relativism which have been 
outlined here so far are not the only ones however: back to the task at hand. 
Said methods would likely be described by Baghramian as definitions of abstraction. Before 
digging deeper into relativism defined negatively, it will be necessary to outline what she calls 
definition by enumeration.9 This particular method ‘is empirical in its orientation in that it lists 
the major doctrines that have been labelled by their advocates or critics as relativist’ 
(Baghramian, p. 1). The main difference between this method and definition by abstraction is 
that definition by enumeration does not seek to find a common thread between the different 
forms of relativism. Both Baghramian and Kusch drafted the above tables on this basis, that all 
the forms of relativism  they listed shared the tendency to follow Haack’s scheme, x is relative 
to y. 
 
7 This will be a topic of discussion in chapter two. There, it will be considered whether the relativist can avoid 
coherence problems if they take up a relativist position with respect to one matter and not another. 
8 Joseph Ratzinger’s views about relativism can be used as an example here too. It would hardly be controversial 
to claim that they might be considered scare mongering. 
9 From this point forward, definitions of abstraction will be referred to as “DA” and definition by enumeration 
will be referred to as “DE”. 
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When DE is used, there need not necessarily be a common thread which connects the various 
forms of relativism which it identifies. That is, of course, aside from the fact that they have all 
been labelled as such, either by their advocates or their critics. Cultural relativism is the first 
example which Baghramian’s DE lists and it has already been briefly mentioned here. This 
theory  was and continues to be primarily developed in the field of anthropology. Cultural 
relativism focuses on ethical, social and aesthetic issues; it has been strongly formulated by 
anthropologists like Clifford Geertz and other earlier figures such as Ed Westermarck. Broadly 
speaking, this theory focuses on the y to which any given x is relative; in the case of cultural 
relativism, y will always represent the cultural context of x. The task of the cultural relativist 
is to examine x and show that it is contingent upon y; that y has not always been the case in the 
past and may not continue to be the case in the future. This is, of course, based on the 
assumption that ethical, social, aesthetic etc issues are evolving just as the cultures which tackle 
them are evolving. Those who accept this premise then use it a base from which they can argue 
that ‘moral norms, aesthetic values  and legal precepts are culture specific and should be 
evaluated according to local criteria only’ (ibid., p. 3). 
According to Baghramian, these arguments are motivated by an ‘acceptance that there is a 
significant degree of diversity in norms, values and beliefs across cultures and historic periods’ 
and ‘a pessimistic induction to the effect that failures of previous attempts to resolve 
disagreements  on moral and cognitive precepts show that there are no universal criteria for 
adjudicating between differing world views’ (ibid.). This is certainly a fascinating insight. 
However, what seems to be presented here is a combination of two domains of relativisation 
listed by the DA presented in her in her representation of Haack’s scheme: historical epochs 
and cultures or social groupings. In short, she seems to conflate historicism with cultural 
relativism. This move is a reasonable one. Of course, cultures and social groupings are 
constantly evolving and will all eventually be confined to one or another historical epoch. 
Contemporary anthropologists facilitated what Baghramian calls the “full articulation” of 
cultural relativism. However, she also suggests that ‘cultural relativism has the longest 
philosophical pedigree, going back to Protagoras and Classical Greece, re-emerging with 
Montaigne at the dawn  of modern philosophy’ (ibid., p. 9). This discussion will have proven 
more than a little sympathetic  to these claims by the time its end is reached; moral cultural 
relativism will be one of the key forms  of relativism to which the latter stages of it will refer. 
For now, though, allow that cultural relativism  is simply one which can defined using 
Baghramian’s DA or DE. 
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Another form of relativism which can be considered as part of a definition by enumeration is 
conceptual relativism. This approach is based on the idea that ‘the world does not present itself 
to  us ready-made or ready-carved, rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways 
of categorising and conceptualizing it’ (ibid., p. 3). It would perhaps be an oversimplification 
to think  of this as a more rationalist method of understanding human life when compared with 
that of cultural relativism, but it may be a useful one. If cultural relativism was born from 
empirical observation of historic and cultural diversity, conceptual relativism was born from 
‘reflection on the connection between mind and the world’ (ibid.). 
It may come as a surprise to learn that the work of Immanuel Kant has occasionally been 
credited with laying foundations for some strands of contemporary relativist thought. This is 
especially true  in conceptual relativism. This is certainly not an uncontroversial claim; many 
will be quick to point  out that the Kantian perspective on a number of topics (ethics perhaps 
being the most obvious one)  bore absolutely no resemblance to a relativistic one. More than 
that, many of Kant’s theories stand  in direct opposition to relativist approaches to matters like 
ethical problems. It is in his distinction  between raw experiences and the conceptual principle 
for organizing them that the lineage can be traced. This theoretical manoeuvre introduced the 
possibility that a variety of equally acceptable incompatible schemes of organization could 
exist. The appeal of this to anyone advocating a relativist perspective should be evident. Kant 
himself may not have been pleased if he had seen how relativist thinkers have interpreted 
aspects of his work, such as a priori knowledge. He certainly considered this concept to be 
anything but relative, nevertheless, the fact that it inspired relativist thought remains. 
‘Naturalist interpretations of Kant's scheme/content distinction… [by Von Helmholtz and 
Wundt] … turned the Kantian a priori into the psychological or physiological categories, and 
hence contingent preconditions of human knowledge’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 40). Baghramian 
seems to be certain of this lineage in her description of conceptual relativism. 
The third form of relativism to which Baghramian refers in her DE is social constructivism. 
This is a more radical form of relativism which is based on the idea that ‘reality… is not simply 
out there to be discovered by empirical investigation or observation only, rather it is constructed 
through a variety of norm-governed socially sanctioned cognitive activities’ (Baghramian, 
2014, p. 4). Examples of these “socially sanctioned cognitive activities” to which Baghramian 
refers include interpretation, description and the manipulation of data. This form of relativism 
is quite a  radical one; the result of social constructivist theory is that different social forces 
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create different “worlds” and ultimately, ‘there is no neutral ground for adjudicating between 
them’ (ibid.). 
Baghramian identifies many of the most prominent criticisms of relativism as directed towards 
the relativism of social constructivism. One example of such a critic would be Paul Boghossian; 
on the other hand, examples of thinkers who have advocated social constructivist perspectives 
include Latour and Woolgar. Arguments from both sides would certainly warrant lengthy 
consideration but as long as the key aspects of social constructivist thought outlined above have 
been understood, enough has been done for the purposes of this chapter. Finally, it may be 
worth noting that social constructivism is a more recent area within relativism; according to 
Baghramian, it finds its roots  in the work of early 20th century psychologists such as Lev 
Vygotsky (ibid., p. 9). 
Another example of a relativism with a more recent pedigree, and one which happens to be the 
most prominent source of support for relativism which exists today, is postmodernism. Widely 
familiar and recognised as one of the more significant intellectual movements of the 20th 
century, postmodernism is also considered a form of relativism in Baghramian’s DE. 
According to her ‘the movement is identified with relativism because of its mistrust of claims 
to objectivity, denial of universal conceptions of rationality and rejection of the role of truth 
and reason as legitimate universal courts of appeal’ (ibid., p. 5). Postmodern points of view 
bear some similarity to those of social constructivist ones. Both viewpoints consider “reality” 
to be a product of social and historical forces. Postmodernists go even further however and 
deny the authority of reason, logic and rationality: ‘The Enlightenment ideal of reason, they 
claim, is a product of local socio-historical conditions and has no universal validity and yet in 
the hands of white men it has become  a tool of intellectual and hence social repression’ (ibid.). 
According to Baghramian, postmodern thought sees any ‘defence of objectivity and universal 
values… [as] …an indication of support for the status quo and a tool of further oppression’ 
(ibid., p. 6). It may be another oversimplification to think of postmodernism as a kind of 
political conception of relativism with a Marxist flavour, but it may also be a useful one. Like 
constructivism, this approach has been a common target of criticism from modern anti-
relativists. 
The final form of relativism which Baghramian includes in her DE is “new relativism”. Also 
known as truth relativism, new relativism was developed by philosophers of language in the 
analytic tradition. This approach was born of a desire to deal with ‘assertions containing 
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predicates  that do not seem suitable for assignment of truth values in the usual fashion’ (ibid., 
p. 6). New relativism is based on the views of Lewis and Kaplan, ‘who believed that 
propositions are true or  false, only relative to a circumstance of evaluation’ (ibid.). The core 
element of new relativist thinking is that the truth of a proposition is not only contingent upon 
the context in which it is first  proposed, but also contingent upon the context in which it is 
being assessed. Examples of contexts  of assessment could include ‘time of assessment, 
information state of assessor, relevance to the range of interests the assessor has, taste 
parameter, and the aesthetic or moral standards of the agent’ (ibid., p. 7). Baghramian identifies 
possible discontinuity between this form of relativism and the others previously outlined too; 
new relativism, according to her, is a ‘mere semantic theory  while older relativisms make ontic 
and epistemic claims’ (ibid.). As a more recent development in  the field of relativism and one 
which is distinctly measured in its approach, it would be interesting  to assess the response it 
has received in the wider landscape of philosophy. However, laying out the main aspects of 




1.3 Negative Definitions 
Baghramian’s work is an invaluable resource for positive definitions as well as the history of 
relativism. She herself would most likely agree that negative definitions are perhaps equally 
important for any thorough attempt to answer the question: what is relativism? She rightly 
points  out that ‘relativism amounts to the rejection of a number of philosophical positions’ 
(ibid., p. 12). Both Kusch and Baghramian hold a generally favourable view towards relativism. 
These sorts of voices are not the only ones who can aid in the task of this chapter. For example, 
the work by William Max Knorpp in his What Relativism Isn’t, a piece solely dedicated to 
defining relativism  negatively forms part of a wider anti-relativist project. 
Knorpp describes himself as ‘more than a little sympathetic’ to objectivist perspectives 
(Knorpp, 1998, p. 278). Despite this, his efforts to define relativism are thorough; it may be 
that he wants to give the subject of his criticism a fair trial in order to provide solid foundations 
for his defence of objectivism. He refers to the general tendency for misconceptions about 
relativism to affect objectivism, when they are deemed simply to be opposites, as the 
motivation for clearing up said misconceptions. In any case, the negative definitions which 
Knorpp provides are useful; to reiterate, understanding what relativism is not perhaps just as 
important as understanding the many things which it can be. 
The first negative definition of relativism outlined by Knorpp is relativism ≠ pluralism. Given 
that pluralism is a term which arguably has an even more diverse set of meanings and uses than 
relativism, it is important to point out that he is discussing moral pluralism in particular here. 
The first manoeuvre executed by Knorpp is to establish a distinction between the following 
two forms  of moral pluralism. 
1. Descriptive moral pluralism 
2. Normative moral pluralism 
Considering this distinction will be doubly useful as it is one which also comes up in 
discussions of relativism.10 
For Knorpp, descriptive moral pluralism is grounded upon the idea of incommensurability 
which, in this case, is the idea that a wide variety of irreconcilable moral perspectives exist. 
This claim only speaks to what is the case, it says nothing about what ought to be the case. This 
 
10 Kusch distinguishes between methodological, descriptive and normative forms of relativism; this will be 
explored further in chapter two. 
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is where normative moral pluralism comes in; a claim of this sort would take this descriptive 
claim “this is” and add that all the moral perspectives it identifies ought to be tolerated. If 
descriptive moral pluralism is grounded on the idea of incommensurability, normative moral 
pluralism is grounded  on this, what Knorpp refers to as, the tolerance thesis. This, he defines 
simply as the idea that ‘a relatively wide variety of beliefs and actions ought to be tolerated’ 
(ibid., p. 283). 
Consider for a moment, the example of the good. Presumably, the descriptive moral pluralist 
would simply want to point out that there are various different conceptions of what is good. 
Similarly, the normative moral pluralist would ask only that we take this assumption and 
consider that these different conceptions of what is good ought to be tolerated. What Knorpp 
wants to point out is that neither say anything about goodness itself, that neither consider 
goodness to be relative for example. Presumably the implication is that one could endorse a 
descriptive or normative pluralist  theory about what is good, with an absolutist conception of 
goodness. This may well be a tenable position to take up. However, it is not very clear why, or 
in what way, something like a descriptive  or normative pluralist theory about what is good, 
with a relativist conception of goodness, would be an untenable one. Knorpp is right to point 
out that they are not inherently relativist theories, but  it seems that they are not necessarily 
absolutist either. 
He is also right to point out that relativisms are often associated with certain areas of the social 
sciences. He cites A.L. Kroeber’s claim that societies should be evaluated on their own terms. 
Also, that there are ‘many values rather than a single value system’ (ibid.). For Knorpp, these 
sentiments are mistakenly classified as cultural relativism; he considers them ‘at least 
somewhat ambiguous between: 
1. ‘A merely sociological claim… that preferences and/or opinions about what is 
valuable differ from group to group’ (ibid.). 
2. ‘A philosophically interesting claim, to the effect that different and 
incompatible “value systems” can both or all be correct’ (ibid.). 
The first claim listed above is, for Knorpp, an example pluralism; the second, an example of 
relativism. On the basis of work done in 1.2 of this discussion, it might be suggested that 
Baghramian would see the first claim as a motivating factor for the second. In other words, it 
is because it one may recognise that values differ from group to group that one may be led to 
the conclusion that different and incompatible value systems can both or all be correct. Knorpp 
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may very well agree with this sentiment, but he certainly would want to say that, although 
acceptance of the claim that values differ from group to group may lead one down the path of 
relativism, it is not a relativist claim in and of itself. 
The second negative definition put forward by Knorpp is relativism ≠ nihilism. According to 
him, ‘alethic nihilism is the view that there is no such thing as truth, that no (e.g.) propositions 
are true  at all – that truth is a fiction’ (ibid., p. 285). Herein lies the key distinction between 
alethic relativism and alethic nihilism, to use Knorpp’s term.11 The former sees truth simply as 
relative, whereas the latter denies the existence of truth in the first place. 
“Relative” here can be defined in a similar manner to that previously used to define “is relative 
to”. That is to say, the term can be seen to represent others such as “contingent upon”, 
“dependent  on”, “conditional upon”, “subject to”, “based on” or “determined by” one thing or 
another. Though it may be implicit, it should be explicitly stated that “relative” here is also 
taken to mean “non-absolute”. Knorpp, in his comparisons between nihilism and relativism, 
sees himself as comparing  two distinct forms of non-absolutism. This is a fair assumption; it 
is unlikely that anyone  sympathetic to either theory would object to it. In the case of relativism, 
as mentioned above, “non- absolute” is perhaps implicit in the labels “relative”, “contingent” 
and so on. 
On this distinction, between relativism and nihilism with respect to truth, Knorpp pithily 
remarks that ‘the relativist holds that there is a lot of truth; the nihilist holds that there is none’ 
(ibid.). Similarly, he says that ‘a relativist does not think that rightness is suspect or ghostly or 
second- class, or anything of the kind – just relative’ (ibid., p. 286). Following this approach, 
one would be led to the conclusion that a nihilist would think that “rightness”, if it is anything 
at all, is indeed  suspect, ghostly or second-class. 
Clifford Geertz, a well-known anthropologist to which this discussion has already referred via 
Baghramian, has also denied that relativism can be conflated with nihilism or that it is some 
sort of version of it. Following the theme set out by Knorpp, he even does so from the 
perspective of cultural relativism specifically in his Anti Anti-Relativism. There, he considers 
whether a “genuine nihilist” is someone who can  be thought to exist in the first place. Geertz 
renders an image of an individual ‘running around in so cosmopolitan a frame of mind as to 
 
11 Alethic here means of or relating to truth, the term could perhaps be used interchangeably with “ontological”. 
That is, because Knorpp is speaking in terms of line 1 in both Kusch and Baghramian’s tables, both of which can 




have no views as to what is and isn’t true, or good, or beautiful’ (Geertz, 2010, p. 375); this 
image is a fantasy according to him. He does not totally rule  out the possibility that there may 
very well be some genuine nihilists out there. However, he contends that if there are, they have 
hardly settled upon their world view after carefully considering the idea that truth, the good or 
beauty might be culturally contingent or relative in any other sense whatsoever. This argument 
is altogether plausible due to the fact that, as Geertz says, most of us are ‘all too committed to 
something or other, usually parochial’ to be considered genuine nihilists (ibid.). 
What Geertz seems to be suggesting here is that one is either a nihilist or not; that in order to 
be considered a “genuine nihilist”, one would have to represent a nihilistic outlook in every 
scenario where it is possible to do so. He can therefore be seen to be an advocate of coherence 
commitments with respect to nihilism. As per section 1.2 of this discussion, it will be assumed 
for the moment that the relativist is not subject to such strict constraints. However, the 
following passages will begin to justify this assumption, its final defence will be offered in 
chapter two. 
Consider the following example12, Jill proposes that aesthetic values are relative to historical 
epochs. She is an art student and spends her days making abstract films. She suggests that if 
she were pursuing the same career in the 16th century, she would likely have spent her days 
painting landscapes or sculpting marble. Similarly, she expects that the work done by students 
in her school will change radically in the future. Jack agrees but also proposes that moral values 
are relative to individual viewpoints and preferences. He pokes fun at Jill and contends that the 
only grounds she has for claiming that the former Tottenham footballer, Sol Campbell signing 
for bitter rivals Arsenal was immoral is that she is a Tottenham fan. Jill firmly denies this, there 
is nothing that could convince her that this betrayal was anything but morally wrong. 
So then, Jill is a relativist when it comes to aesthetics but a moral absolutist when it comes to 
footballing loyalties. Does this mean she is not a genuine relativist? It may be just as unlikely 
that there could be someone who would take up a relativist position in all cases as it is that 
there could  be a “genuine nihilist” in Geertz’s eyes. However, this does not mean there is no 
such thing as a genuine relativist. This is another reason why relativism cannot be conflated 
with, or considered some kind of version of, nihilism. 
 
12 This is a more developed version of another example given in relation to Baghramian’s table in section 1.2. 
There, it was put that one might make the historicist proposition that, referring back to Baghramian’s table, x is 
relative to line B but also reject the subjectivist proposition that x is relative to line A. 
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If one were to make this argument, they would perhaps be guilty of advocating for an idea 
dreamt  up by Rorty and Edmundson, what Knorpp calls, “the myth myth”. That is, ‘the myth 
that relativism is a myth, that no one has ever held the view’ (Knorpp, 1998, p. 289). This leads 
to the  final negative definition of relativism which will be presented here: relativism ≠ 
theoretical egalitarianism. As the name suggests, theoretical egalitarianism holds that one 
theory is as valid as any other; it is, what might be called, an “anything goes” argument. This 
is a stick which is often used to beat relativism, unfairly so. It is not implicit in any attempt to 
demonstrate that a theory is relative, that said theory is no better or worse than any other theory. 
As per Knorpp, these manoeuvres are clearly distinct, ‘there is a clear difference between [the 
suggestion that] a view is good only relative to some perspective and [the suggestion that] no 
view  is better than any other (ibid., p. 290). One need not abandon their views upon accepting 
that they  are relative. Similarly, one need not concede that their, e.g., ontological, semantic, 
moral, epistemic or gustatory; views are equal to those of others if one were to declare 
themselves an, e.g., ontological, semantic, moral, epistemic or gustatory; relativist. There are 
a number of allies to this claim that might be called upon. Joshua Greene, to whom the chapter 
two will also refer, suggests that ‘recognizing that there is no objective reason to favour oneself 
over others does not entail abandoning one's subjective reasons for favouring oneself’ (Greene, 
2014, p. 201). Similarly, Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian and David Wong suggest that ‘the 
localized and contingent nature of many of the values we hold dear is no reason for not 
cherishing them, no reason to deny them a constitutive role in providing meaning’ (Flanagan, 




Chapter 2: How Worried Should we be? 
Introduction 
As stated in 1.1, ‘the history of relativism is simultaneously a history of the attempts to refute 
it’ (Baghramian, 2010, p. 33). This is perhaps just as attributable to the anxieties that have so 
often surrounded this topic as it is to the confusion that has done the same. However, this 
chapter will not seek to suggest that there are no forms of relativism about which we ought to 
worry. For this reason, section 2.1 will consider some tenable and untenable relativisms. Martin 
Kusch has highlighted a distinction between descriptive, methodological and normative 
relativisms. One might be tempted to divert all worries towards normative forms, but this would 
perhaps go too far  to limit the scope of a relativist stance. In Kusch’s view, normative forms 
of relativism are the only ones which exclude the possibility of absolute truth. 
Seeing that later sections of this project will seek to endorse a metaethical perspective which 
excludes absolutism, whether or not normative relativism is a cause for worry will need to be 
considered further in section 2.2. There, an alternative conception of normative relativism, that 
of Ryan Gillespie, will be considered. Ultimately, it will be argued that many of the features of 
normative relativism about which the likes of Gillespie and others have urged us to worry are 
already prevalent in contemporary society. In that context, many possible features of normative 
relativism are actively encouraged. Namely, what Knorpp has referred to as the tolerance 
thesis. The normative relativist shares with the likes of Barack Obama, the idea that one ought 
to translate their own particular values into universal values that might be shared by wider 
society. 
One key trait of an individual equipped to do this is an acceptance of moral irrealism. This and 
other features of a ‘card carrying’ (Kusch, 2019, p. 6) relativist will be explored in section 2.3. 
There, it will also be argued that a relativism which embraces moral realism is one about which 
we certainly ought to be worried – if it were a popular stance. However, it will also be argued, 
that  moral realism is rarely embraced by the relativist; that most if not all card carriers would 
be more  likely to favour moral irrealism in metaethical debates. This will be the first step 
necessary to reach  the conclusion that becoming a card carrier would be an attractive prospect, 
rather than anything about which we ought to be worried. Finally, section 2.3 will consider 
whether the relativist can justifiably defend relativism is one domain and not another, thus 
avoiding any potential coherence problems. 
29 
 
2.1 Tenable and Untenable Relativisms 
Section 1.3 made reference to Knorpp’s distinction between descriptive and normative moral 
pluralism, Martin Kusch has established a similar distinction with respect to relativism. In his 
general introduction to the topic, A Primer on Relativism, Kusch identifies three distinct forms 
of relativism: descriptive, methodological and normative. For Kusch, ‘forms of descriptive 
relativism claim that, as far as moral beliefs or standards are concerned, one finds 
fundamentally different standards in different cultures’ (Kusch, 2019, p. 3). On the other hand, 
‘forms of methodological relativism insist that in investigating moralities we had better 
approach cultural differences in an “impartial” and “symmetrical” way’ (ibid.), in his view. 
However, there is one key similarity between two of these three forms of relativism identified 
by Kusch in his Primer, ‘descriptive and methodological forms of relativism’, he suggests, 
‘leave open the possibility that there are absolute norms or truths’ (ibid.). Interestingly, he adds 
that ‘as far as descriptive or methodological relativisms are concerned, one of the cultures 
might well be on the absolutely right track’ (ibid.). As for Normative relativisms, they take 
matters one crucial step further and ‘deny that there are any absolutely true or absolutely correct 
beliefs or standards’ at all (ibid.). 
The above suggestions may come as a surprise to some, one might imagine that many anti 
relativists would be at least somewhat appeased if it were true that not all relativisms deny the 
existence of absolutely true or correct beliefs or standards. With that said, it may be tempting 
to conclude that one should worry about normative forms of relativism and not others but that 
would perhaps oversimplify things slightly. Whilst it is unlikely that anyone would be worried 
by descriptive or methodological relativisms, as defined here at least, normative relativism will 
likely have the potential to do so. Kusch outlines several different possible features of a 
normative relativism; the following pages will list some of these features and assess whether 
or not they are properly considered worrisome. 
As well as advancing the overarching question posed by this chapter, this will serve to lay out 
some of the features of both tenable and untenable relativisms. It will be argued here that not 
all possible features of a normative relativism outlined by Kusch are indefensible, on the 
contrary. Those that are, as it will be shown, are not represented by real world, what Kusch 
refers to as, “card-carrying” relativists. Many of these features, which have been repeatedly 
attributed to relativism by its critics, have been rejected by card carriers (ibid., p. 6). 
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The first feature of any relativism listed by Kusch is dependence. He describes this as the idea 
that  ‘a belief has an epistemic status only relative to either… a system of epistemic principles 
[regularism], or… a coherent bundle of precedents or paradigms [particularism]’ (ibid., p. 4). 
It is  not inherent in the suggestion that the regularist or particularist ideas on which a belief 
depends cannot be absolute; further elements need to be considered. This would include 
pluralism, which Kusch describes as the idea that there can be more than one system or bundle 
relative to which a belief can claim epistemic status. Still, this combination of ideas should not 
be cause for too much controversy; it is not difficult to accept that there are different sources 
from which a belief can draw its epistemic status. 
Take, for example, the belief that the earth is round. This claim can be verified as true on the 
basis  of a number of different regularist or particularist findings. Two astronauts in orbit 
around the earth can look down and observe that it is round. Of course, they can verbally agree 
upon this observation and verify that what they are both looking at is the earth and that it is 
round. They can  also take a photograph in order to document their findings and solidify the 
epistemic status of their  shared belief. 
Similarly, any one of us could walk ten thousand kilometres in one direction, turn ninety 
degrees to our right, walk another ten thousand kilometres, turn right again, walk a final ten 
thousand kilometres and find that we have ended up where we had started. Therefore, we would 
have mapped out a triangle on the earth’s surface using only ninety-degree angles; a feat which 
could only be achieved on a round surface. These are just some of the means by which the 
proposition “the earth is round” can be verified. The fact that there are various means of doing 
this, from photography to geometry, should do nothing to undermine the epistemic status of 
the belief. 
In other words, the fact that there is more than one method of labelling a proposition “true” 
should not make it any less so. Individuals may find one or another of these methods more or 
less convincing but ultimately, they will come away with the same impression; that “the earth 
is round” is a true proposition. Clearly, this definition of pluralism alone is no cause for 
concern, nor does it  seem to imply normative relativism as Kusch understands it. 
Adding non-absolutism to the equation will bring us closer to a normative relativism. 
According to Kusch, non-absolutism is ‘the minimal characterization of normative relativism’ 
(ibid., p. 5). The non-absolutist would suggest that none of the systems or bundles on which 
our beliefs depend  can be absolutely correct. Something should be said about the terms 
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“systems” and “bundles” as they are used here. The former, for Kusch, refers to a ‘system of 
epistemic principles and the latter, to a ‘coherent bundle of precedents or paradigms’ (ibid., p. 
4). The precise meaning of these terms,  it may be argued, remains a little vague. For now, it 
will be assumed, following the examples used  above, that these terms may refer to practices 
such as photography or geometry. 
Photography might be considered a source of epistemic verification based on the coherent 
bundle  of precedents or paradigms which surround it. Photography could be seen to have 
brought about a paradigmatic shift in the way knowledge is verified; from the moment the first 
photograph was taken, a new precedent was set. Provided viewers are satisfied that a 
photograph has not been doctored, they take it to be an accurate snapshot of a moment in time 
and therefore a robust method by which a proposition, that the earth is round for example, can 
be verified. Similarly, the laws of geometry represent a fine example of a system of epistemic 
principles. To continue with the previous example, provided one understands that two 90o turns 
can only lead to the same point on  a round surface, one has a robust method by which the 
proposition “the earth is round” can be verified. 
In response to these examples, non-absolutism as defined by Kusch would hold that neither 
photographs of the earth nor the theorem outlined above can prove with absolute certainty that 
it is in fact round. Of course, we have all come to trust photography – “the camera never lies” 
– and  the laws of geometry are difficult to doubt. However, even if one can be absolutely 
confident in the methods of systems or bundles such as these, Kusch’s non-absolutist would 
nevertheless hold  that systems or bundles such as these can never be absolutely correct.13 
So then, in order to deny that there are absolutely true or absolutely correct beliefs or standards, 
one must be committed to non-absolutism. It is not difficult to imagine how this may be 
construed as a significant cause for concern. If there are not absolutely true or absolutely correct 
beliefs or standards, is there such a thing as truth at all? If given the choice between absolute 
truth or none at all, hardly anyone would, or perhaps even could, choose the latter. There is 
little that could be done to undermine many of the most commonly held beliefs or standards; 
that “the earth is round” is a true proposition for example. 
 
13 It is here assumed that photography and geometry can be properly understood as the sorts of things Kusch had 
in mind when he referred to “systems” and “bundles”. Once again, “systems” seems to refer to a system of 
epistemic principles and “bundles” seems to refer to a bundle of precedents or paradigms (Kusch, 2019, p. 4). One 
may or may not agree that the examples offered here fit these descriptions but seeing that Kusch offered none of 
his own, they are perhaps as good as any. 
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Thankfully, there is nothing that necessitates a choice between absolutist truth and none at all; 
few matters, if any, are so black and white. On the other hand, the earth is either round or it is 
not, and this must be acknowledged; but the minimum requirement for proving one of these 
two options to  be true – for labelling one of them as a fact – is certainly up for debate. One 
might suggest that a proposition must be shown to be an absolute truth if it is to be considered 
a fact, but this is not the only viable approach. If a fact can be properly understood as a thing 
that is proven to be true, there  is no reason to deny that a thing which is proven to be true in a 
relative sense is not a fact. 
So many different credible sources report that the earth is round, that few would take issue with 
the suggestion that it has been proven to be true. That is to say, the majority of people take “the 
earth is round” to be a fact; only a tiny minority doubt it. Allow for a moment Kusch’s non-
absolutist is right to suggest that this and other propositions can be considered true in a relative 
sense only; this should not do anything to affect the suggestion that “the earth is round” is a 
fact. Even if a proposition such as this can be proven to be true only in a relative sense, it can 
still be proven to be true; therefore, in the non-absolutist’s world, propositions can still be facts. 
It is for this reason that a relativism which invokes non-absolutism need not be deemed a cause 
for concern. 
Unlike pluralism, non-absolutism is more intrinsically linked with normative relativisms. 
However, like pluralism, it should not do much to worry anyone interested in the preservation 
of facts. Speaking of facts, there are, of course, not many which are uncontested; as mentioned 
briefly  above, even “the earth is round” has its doubters. This leads nicely to, what Kusch 
refers to as, an  assumption which can be combined with non-absolutism – conflict. According 
to him, normative relativisms can recognize the conflict between epistemic verdicts such as 
“the earth is round” and “the earth is flat” and arrive at the conclusion that they exclude one 
another. This conclusion is reached either ‘because the two systems or bundles give 
incompatible answers to the same question’, or ‘because the advocates of one system or bundle 
find the answers suggested by the advocates of another system or bundle unintelligible’ (ibid., 
p. 5). Regardless, this is an approach which hardly anyone is likely to accept. 
This, if anything, would have to be deemed a feature of an untenable relativism. If it were to 
gain traction and become a central element of relativist thought, there would certainly be a 
cause to worry about relativism. It is one thing to question the bedrock of what is deemed to be 
factual, it is quite another to claim that there are no facts. Neither flat-earthers, round-earthers 
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nor anyone in between would accept that their epistemic verdict is any less true simply because 
someone disagrees with them. 
Similarly, Kusch suggests that a normative relativism could combine non-absolutism with the 
idea that different systems or bundles, to use his terms again, are symmetrical because they 
are… 
based on nothing but local causes of credibility [LOCALITY]; and/or (b) impossible to rank 
except on the basis of a specific system or bundle [NON-NEUTRALITY]; and/or (c) equally 
true or valid [EQUAL VALIDITY]; and/or (d) impossible to rank since the evaluative terms of 
one system or bundle seem not applicable to another system or bundle [NON-APPRAISAL] 
(ibid., p.5-6).  
The primary sticking point here is likely to be the principal of equal validity. This, to reiterate, 
is the idea that, what Kusch refers to as, different systems or bundles are ‘equally true or valid’ 
(ibid.). It might be suggested, the claim that x and y are equally true is practically comparable 
to the claim that neither x nor y can be true. That is, only if one must insist that existence of 
lots of truth means that there is no truth. 
This idea is one which is arguably becoming less prevalent, at least in W.E.I.R.D societies.14 
Consider some of the religious attitudes in this society, for example. Members of different 
religions  in these societies, for the most part, recognize that their conception of religious truth 
is not the only  one and that others are in their states are to be respected. It may well be that the 
Christian, Muslim,  Hindu, Buddhist and so on, in these states each think that the other is wrong, 
but they are, in some sense, all allowed to be right. 
That is to say, the principal of equal validity applies in practice even if not in theory when it 
comes  to religious truth in W.E.I.R.D attitudes. Religious and nonreligious people are all 
expected to respect each other’s beliefs, to allow space for different conceptions of religious 
truth and at least behave as though they are all equally valid at a political level.15 When this 
does not happen, whether it be through demonstrations or violent attacks, there is anything 
from general distaste to  public outrage. Far from any sort of cause for concern, the principal 
 
14 Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic 
15 This argument will be developed further in 2.2, it runs contrary to some anti-relativist arguments attributed to 




of equal validity can be thought of as an essential element of political life in W.E.I.R.D 
societies. 
So then, descriptive and methodological relativisms are surely tenable. They can hardly be 
considered theories about which many will be worried – given that they ‘leave open the 
possibility that there are absolute norms or truths’ (ibid., p. 3). On the basis, at least, of Kusch’s 
understanding detailed above, it seems that forms of normative relativism can be thought of in 
the same way. That is, if they avoid certain possible features which many would consider 




2.2 Equal Validity, Tolerance & Realism vs. Irrealism Within a Relativist Framework 
Section 2.1 has established that descriptive, methodological and even some normative 
relativisms are very tenable positions to take up; ones which need not cause any great concern. 
Few would likely take issue with the claims made there about descriptive and methodological 
relativisms, but  the same cannot perhaps be said of those made about normative ones. Of 
course, Kusch’s ideas about normative relativism are not the only ones that exist. Those not 
quite so sympathetic to the cause, in particular, have had their own ideas about the normative 
implications of relativism – one  typical example of these will be investigated. It will then be 
considered how moral realism and moral irrealism can be understood with respect to relativism. 
Ultimately, it will be argued that the  former is one about which we ought to worry, and the 
latter is not such a cause for concern. 
Firstly though, some anti-relativist perspectives that appear in Ryan Gillespie’s Normative 
Reasoning and Moral Argumentation in Theory and Practice will be considered. It will be 
assumed here that the efforts to dismiss the principal of equal validity referred to in that text – 
a version of  an anti-relativist argument attributed to Paul Boghossian by him – are motivated 
by concerns about  a view which would see systems or bundles, to use Kusch’s term, as equally 
valid. This will serve  to strengthen the claim made in 2.1; that the principal of equal validity, 
a feature of normative relativisms for Kusch, should not worry us. 
In the text mentioned above, Gillespie attributes a version of the following argument to Paul 
Boghossian: relativist propositions, like “morality is relative to culture”, can be descriptive in 
nature but can, at the same time, have normative implications. The claim is not considered 
problematic in isolation – it is uncontroversial to claim that ‘many people in many different 
cultures have different moral beliefs’ (Gillespie, 2016, p. 49). However, ‘when one adopts 
moral relativism… the claim accrues a normative dimension’ – the result of which is a 
‘flattening out of rightness, of one moral belief being better than another regardless of culture’ 
(ibid.). This is well and good but, Boghossian might say, ‘in practice, humans rarely, if ever, 
actually behave as if certain things or beliefs are not better than others, as evidenced in 
everything from foreign policy  to religion to consumption choices’ (ibid., p. 50). 
Translating these sentiments to Kusch’s terminology, Gillespie’s Boghossian wants to establish 
that the principal of equal validity is not valid. That people do not see “certain things or beliefs” 
as equal to one another. It will be argued here that, even if only in W.E.I.R.D societies at the 
very least, that is exactly what they do. This argument has been made briefly in 2.1 but it will 
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be reformulated in its full form here. This will serve both to push back against Boghossian’s 
criticisms and demonstrate that the ‘flattening out of rightness, of one moral belief being better 
than another regardless of culture’ (ibid., p. 49) is practiced and with good reason. Of course, 
it is not clear what  is meant by “certain things” – so, in evaluating this claim here, belief will 
be the main focus. 
One does not necessarily need to be a relativist to make this argument; as per Joshua Greene, 
a version of it has been made by one of the more well-liked leaders of the W.E.I.R.D world, 
Barack Obama. Helpfully, Obama, in the following statement quoted by Greene, also focuses 
on belief and uses the example of religion… 
Democracy demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, 
rather than religion-specific values. It requires that their proposals be subject to argument, and 
amenable to reason. I may be opposed to abortion for religious reasons, but if I seek to pass a 
law banning the practice, I cannot simply point to the teachings of my church or [invoke] God’s 
will. I have to explain why abortion violates some principle that is accessible to people of all 
faiths, including those with no faith at all (Greene, 2014, p. 175) 
There is great potential for controversy here, one can imagine there are many who are, or would 
be, horrified at the suggestion that they might need to bracket their religion-specific values in 
order  to engage in political discourse. Former conservative US senator, and all-round 
problematic figure, Rick Santorum declared that this statement had made him sick to his 
stomach; ‘what kind of country do we live in that says only people of non-faith can come into 
the public square and make  their case?’ (ibid. p. 176). Of course, this is not what Obama is 
implying. Non-secular values – or  rather, values which cannot be presented in a neutral way – 
are not exclusive to religious perspectives. The point is that all religious and irreligious people 
alike must be able to present their  particular concerns in a way that is accessible to those who 
do not share their values. Anyone can “come to the public square and make our case”, as 
Santorum puts it, so long as they can meet this  criterion. 
If their concerns are voiced in such a way that they can be accessible to everyone, they are 
more likely to elicit sympathy and support; perhaps, eventually they can then be written into 
the law of  the land as “universal” values of the democracy. One way of interpreting what 
Obama is trying to  do here is to urge, in this case, religious people to set aside their moral 
realism for the benefit of their fellow citizens. This is most likely because, as Greene suggests, 
religions ‘exacerbate, rather than ease, conflicts between the values of Us and the values of 
Them’ (ibid., p. 183). The sort of person to which Obama refers in his statement can be 
37 
 
considered a moral realist because they derive their moral convictions from the teachings of 
their church or the perceived will of their god.  This, if anything, is an absolute standard for 
morality – one with which few beyond their faith would likely sympathise. 
If they were to set aside this approach, in favour of a moral irrealism, they might become better 
able to express their concerns to members of different faiths, or non-believers. This would not 
necessarily entail abandoning their moral convictions, but it would force them to think about 
how  something like abortion, to use Obama’s example, affects their society from a secular 
perspective. That is, because moral irrealism would detach them from the stringent 
commitment to the existence of absolute moral facts set by the tenets of their faith.16 Interesting 
as it may be to consider, equating Obama’s statement above with an argument in favour of 
moral irrealism in this manner can hardly be seen as anything other than mere conjecture. 
It may simply be that Obama wants to argue against religion-specific values, in favour of 
secular- democratic ones. Perhaps even secular-democratic values with foundations just as 
absolute as “Gods will” or any source of religion-specific moral convictions. Similarly, it may 
be that he is making a prescriptivist argument with purely pragmatic, political considerations 
in mind. Only Obama himself can speak to the motivations of this statement but, seeing as it is 
perhaps the most  likely to be the case and for argument’s sake, we will assume that his 
concerns here are more practical than anything; that he is simply searching for, to borrow a 
term used by Joshua Greene in his Moral Tribes, a “common currency” of morality. 
According to Greene, a “common currency” of morality is as ‘a universal metric for weighing 
the values of different tribes’ which can form the basis of what he calls “metamorality” (ibid., 
p. 175).  If this is in fact what Obama is after, he would perhaps not be very enthused to be 
associated with  the principal of equality but again, because this cannot really be known and 
for argument’s sake, we will assume that he can conceive of a ‘system for making compromises 
[and] trade-offs’ (ibid.) with a different idea of common currency than that of Greene. In other 
words, that his idea of common currency need not rank the values of different tribes, to use 
Greene’s term, and instead seeks to accommodate them all equally as much as possible. 
This should not be too farfetched an assumption, surely democracies can be said to at least try 
to accommodate all perspectives. It is in the spirit of this that Obama seems to be making the 
 
16 These sentiments should not be conflated with the tolerance thesis [see 1.3]; which, as per Knorpp, is a possible 




statement referenced above in the first place. This may just be enough to constitute an implicit 
endorsement of the principal of equal validity. Similarly, it may be enough to constitute an 
endorsement of the tolerance thesis which, as per Knorpp, is a possible feature of a normative 
relativism.17 Kusch also identifies this in relativisms, he sees it as a common motivation for 
those  who endorse relativist views (Kusch, 2019, p. 9). 
This, of course, does not provide sufficient grounds for the claim that Obama is some sort of 
secret relativist. If the suggestion that his statement referenced here is a critique of moral 
realism would  be conjecture, this certainly would be too. To repeat, it is far more likely that 
he is simply making a prescriptive argument with pragmatic, political motivations in mind. 
Farfetched as it may be that Obama is a secret relativist and/or moral irrealist, it is still possible. 
If this were the case, and these were the motivations behind his statement, would it suddenly 
become a cause for concern? Surely only the likes of Rick Santorum would maintain that it 
ought to worry us. 
Not enough has been said about moral realism, moral irrealism and the ways in which they can 
fit within a relativist framework. This will be important both for advancing the overarching 
question posed by this chapter18 and for laying foundations for the final chapter of this 
discussion. There, particular focus will be directed towards a moral irrealist relativism. For 
now, though, consider moral realism. It has already been suggested here that “the religiously 
motivated”, through their commitment to the tenets of their faith, are usually moral realists. If 
moral realism can be understood as a commitment to the idea of absolute moral truth. Clearly, 
this will also mean that they are, at the same time, usually not relativists. It can therefore be 
deduced that neither moral realism is intrinsically linked with any form relativism. 
The same can be said of moral irrealism, as it will be suggested in chapter three, one can 
simultaneously be a moral irrealist and a relativist – but it is also possible to simply be one or 
the other. If the religiously motivated anti-abortionist can be taken as an example of a non-
relativist moral realist, an example of a non-relativist moral realist might be something like an 
emotivist. Broadly associated with the metaethical theory referred to as noncognitivism, which 
will be another focus of chapter three, emotivism represents irrealism due to the fact that it 
denies that there are objective moral values. The most basic understanding of emotivism refers 
to it as a “boo- hurrah” theory. That is, because emotivism – again, according to the most basic 
 
17 See 1.3. 
18 I.e., by assessing whether or not we ought to be concerned about moral realist or irrealist relativisms. 
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understanding of  it – does not deem moral propositions capable of being labelled “true” or 
“false”. 
In other words, emotivism does not consider moral statements to be truth apt. The emotivist 
instead would take  a statement like “stealing is wrong” as simply another way of saying “boo 
stealing”; or statements like “becoming a vegetarian is the right thing to do” as another way of 
saying “yay vegetarianism”.  A significant part of the chapter three will go on to argue that the 
relativist need not deny that moral statements such as “stealing is wrong” or “vegetarianism is 
the right” can be truth apt. This will take some proving but of course, that task is outside the 
scope of this section. For now, allow that the relativist can deny that there are objective moral 
values without denying that moral statements can be truth apt. Therefore, emotivism can be 
considered an example of a non-relativist moral irrealism. 
Enough about emotivism and religiously motivated anti-abortionists, what about moral realist 
and irrealist relativisms?19 First, consider the latter: M.I.R would deny the suggestion that there 
are any absolute moral truth or objective moral facts. It would, of course, also suggest that any 
attempt to speak about moral truth or facts could only ever hope to be successful in a relative 
sense. According  to M.I.R, moral propositions are always determined by, or reliant upon, some 
contingent or variable factor. This theory would certainly be a cause for concern if it were to 
also stipulate that, because they cannot represent absolute or objective truth or fact, they are 
really incapable of being labelled “true” or “false” and are therefore meaningless. Chapter three 
will go on to demonstrate that moral propositions can, in fact, be truth apt and that we need not 
worry about M.I.R. 
M.R.R, on the other hand, would share with moral absolutism the idea that there are 
independent moral truths. A M.R.R would, of course, stipulate that there are more than one set 
of these truths, and they are determined by cultural context or some other variable factor. If it 
is not already clear why such a theory would be a cause for concern, one need only imagine 
that, for example, it would most likely determine that slave ownership was right in the context 
of the pre-civil war American South. No set of truths can, in this approach, ever really be 
wrong; “might makes right”. It is hard  to imagine that anyone would abide a theory with as 
thorny an implication as this – M.R.R is certainly one form of relativism about which we ought 
to worry. Real world, what Kusch calls, card carrying relativists share this intuition, but how 
 




can they be concerned about thorny implications? Are they not just as guilty of creating them 




2.3 The Card Carrying Relativist 
The first two sections of this chapter have sought to establish which features of a given 
relativism can be justifiably considered worrisome. The purpose of this section will be to argue 
that those features which fit that description are not of relativisms defended by real world, what 
Kusch has referred to as, “card carrying” relativists. To recap, section 2.1 suggested that one 
clear example of an untenable relativism would be a normative relativism that would suggest 
that conflicting propositions cancel each other out. Section 2.2 then argued that there would be 
cause for concern  if a moral realist relativism were to gain popularity. 
This section will argue that these more pernicious forms of relativism are not actually 
represented  by card carrying relativists. Kusch has his own ideas about the meaning of this 
term20, but these will not be a main focus here. Instead, a hypothetical card carrier will be 
dreamt up. Firstly, based  on some of the work done in 2.1 and 2.2, the sort of relativism which 
our hypothetical card carrier  might represent will be considered. Then, it will be determined 
whether this hypothetical relativist  can avoid coherence problems. In other words, whether it 
is possible to be a relativist in one domain but not another. Finally, by extension of that 
discussion of potential coherence problems, it will be determined whether the relativist can be 
allowed to choose when to defend relativism and when to shy away from doing so. 
It is fair to say that, up to this point, identifying oneself as a card carrying relativist has not 
been especially popular. Even those who might be considered prime candidates have worked 
hard to distance themselves from the label. One such example can be found in the work of 
Joshua Greene. The first patch of common ground between Greene and the card carrying 
relativist which will be presented here is the denial of realism. Of course, it is theoretically 
possible to hold a M.R.R perspective. In practice however, it is one which is seldom, if ever, 
defended seriously. If M.R.R were to be defended seriously, it would likely cause more than a 
little controversy. Even some of  the more controversial relativist perspectives represented in 
recent years have perhaps not gone so far as to embrace realism. 
To embrace M.R.R would involve both affirming that whatever may be deemed a true 
proposition, for example, is absolute as well as relative in some sense. The M.R.R would adopt 
something of an “anything goes” policy, where more than one moral position on a given topic 
would be right. In other words, two conflicting moral judgements like “slavery is wrong” and 
 
20 Kusch lists the likes of Bloor, Field and Herbert as examples of card carrying relativists in his view. 
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“slavery is right” would both be allowed the space to be moral absolutes. Their truth value 
would most likely be determined by one of a number of variable factors – cultural context, for 
example. In this case, that  of the moral realist cultural relativist, “slavery is right” would have 
to be judged an absolute truth,  when in the context of pre-civil war American South. Of course, 
the implications of this theory are  problematic, it is likely one which would not appeal to many. 
It is surely far more common to consider that slave owners during that period were anything 
from misguided, to outright evil. Non relativist moral realists have a straightforward means to 
defend this claim and reject M.R.R. Namely, by pointing to their particular conception of 
absolute moral  truth and demonstrating how M.R.R does not align with that. Quite simply, by 
establishing that “slavery is wrong” has and always will be the case, regardless of cultural 
context or any other variable factor whatsoever. Our hypothetical card carrier can be described 
as a M.I.R and therefore, must set about defending the claim that slave owners were anything 
from misguided, to outright evil without absolutes; this is not quite so straight forward. 
Our hypothetical card carrier, let us refer to him as John, cannot deny that “slavery is right” 
was a true claim in the very specific context of the law of the land in the pre-civil war American 
south. However, being a moral irrealist, he can of course deny that this claim, “slavery is right” 
was ever  an absolute truth. He can therefore argue that its “rightness” was weak and destined 
to be swallowed up by the tide of moral progress. If given the choice between these two options, 
many  would likely favour the former and hold that “slavery is wrong” is an absolute truth. 
John too would like this to be the case. 
Like Joshua Greene, who can arguably be labelled an example of a non-relativist moral 
irrealist, John longs for the ability to discover moral truths in the way that we have been able 
to discover the cause of earthquakes. If this were possible, as Greene says, we’d be in good 
shape to solve the  moral problems that occupy so much of our attention; ‘but instead, we’re 
thrown back on the morass of competing moral values’ (Greene, 2014, p. 188). John’s M.I.R 
could be seen as the result of Greene’s pessimistic induction that reason by itself doesn’t tell 
us how to make trade-offs among  the competing values of different moral tribes, and it doesn’t 
tell us which rights we have or how people's competing rights weigh against one another’ (ibid., 
p. 185). 
Is Joshua Greene therefore an example of a M.I.R? Can his work simply be considered in place 
of John, our imagined card carrier? Greene himself would deny that he might be considered 
any sort  of relativist; according to him, “the proverbial relativist” simply holds that ‘there are 
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different tribes with different values, and that’s all there is to say’ (ibid., p. 290). Well and 
good, but this criticism does not apply to the card carrying relativist that has been imagined 
here. John can, as suggested above, judge that certain moral claims are stronger or weaker 
based on a projection of the course of moral progress. Moral progress, he claims, can be more 
easily advanced if M.I.R is embraced and ‘we've resigned ourselves to working with the 
morass’ (ibid., p. 188). 
If this were to be the case, as per Greene, ‘the question of moral truth [would lose] its practical 
importance’ (ibid.). Far from standing in the way of moral progress, the loss of moral truth’s 
practical importance would perhaps even fast track it. Unattached to one or another conception 
of absolute moral truth, following Jesse Prinz’s conception of moral relativism, we would then 
be allowed to think about morality as a tool. We would then be able to ‘think about what we’d 
like that tool to do for us’ and ‘revise morality accordingly’ (Prinz, 2011, p. 5) 
John has so far been described as a card carrying relativist insofar as he represents M.I.R, but 
it will now be considered whether he can hold non-relativist positions in other areas and 
maintain a consistent position. Section 1.2 made reference to Baghramian’s DE, which 
identified conceptual relativism as the idea that ‘the world does not present itself to us ready-
made or ready-carved, rather we supply different, and at times incompatible, ways of 
categorising and conceptualizing it’ (Baghramian, 2014, p. 3). Although John maintains a 
relativist stance with respect to morality, he firmly considers himself a conceptual absolutist. 
His moral relativism is born of the belief that moral truths cannot be discovered in the way that 
we have been able to discover the cause of earthquakes. On the other hand, his conceptual 
absolutism is born of the belief that it is very much  possible to discover the true cause of 
earthquakes, for example. 
It is not immediately evident how these two positions could be considered incompatible or 
liable to cause any sort of coherence problems. Something like an earthquake, John would 
argue, is a very tangible event; those who experience it can be left with no doubt about its 
effects. Moral propositions are not quite so tangible; however, if some sort of natural disaster, 
perhaps an earthquake, were to eradicate all traces of human life, one could imagine that 
morality as we know  it would be lost too. There is surely no reason to believe that this would 
have any sort of effect on earthquakes however, they can hardly be considered intrinsically 
linked with human existence. Also, moral claims can hardly be considered natural phenomena. 
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It might be suggested that another species could possibly evolve to discover the moral truths 
which are upheld so strongly by us humans, but that would be more than a little speculative. 
It is then, fair to say, that one can simultaneously be considered a relativist and an absolutist 
without holding incompatible positions or committing any coherence problems in at least some 
cases. Of course, if John were to maintain his M.I.R position with respect to one ethical issue 
and not another, he would be guilty of creating coherence problems. On the whole however, it 
is possible to be a relativist in one domain and not another. By extension, of course, the card 
carrying  relativist need not defend all versions of relativism. The earlier parts of this chapter 
have laid out some versions of relativism which few if any are likely to defend. Our 
hypothetical card carrier John, and any other perspective relativist are well within their rights 
to reject one or another version of the theory with which they do not identify. Similarly, they 
need not answer to criticisms to which their relativisms do not apply. 
Greene’s “proverbial relativist” paints the image of a kind of anti-theorist that seeks to engage 
in theory only to show that no theory can be done but this charge cannot be levelled at our 
hypothetical card carrier. If anything, John can be seen as someone seeking a viable way to 
think about morality and facilitate moral progress in a way that recognises, what Greene refers 
to as, ‘the morass of competing moral values’ (Greene, 2014, p. 188) and tries to make sense 
of it. For this reason, John, as a card carrying relativist is not someone about which we ought 





Chapter 3: Relativism, Yes! Expressivism, No! 
Introduction 
Chapter one set out to undermine some of the more general critiques of relativism that have 
been prevalent throughout the history of western philosophy by shining a light on the diverse 
perspectives which are encapsulated by the term. However, the anxiety created by these 
critiques   is not so easy to dismiss. The second chapter was therefore dedicated to pushing 
back against this  anxiety, which has persistently surrounded relativisms, by emphasising that 
some of the more pernicious forms of relativism are not actually supported by real world, “card 
carrying” relativists – to use Kusch’s term. The third chapter of this discussion will now explore 
some of the factors that might make becoming a card carrying relativist something of an 
attractive prospect. The central element of such a relativism, according to the sections that 
follow, is moral irrealism. It will be shown how a relativist stance can be made available within 
moral irrealism and why this would be an attractive one to take up compared to other forms of 
relativisms and moral irrealisms. 
3.1 will situate relativism within the context of other forms of moral irrealism21, primarily 
expressivism, a noncognitivist-like theory advanced by Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons. An 
overview of these two forms of moral irrealism will be presented by highlighting some of the 
arguments in Wittgenstein’s Lecture on ethics; subsequently showing that, although they may 
be construed as such, Wittgenstein’s arguments are not examples of relativism or expressivism. 
It will then be argued that this divergence, between this triad of moral irrealist theories22, is the 
result of  a difference of approach with respect to descriptivism; that relativism is a descriptivist 
theory and expressivism is a nondescriptivist one. 
3.2 will also utilise Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics, in this case, as an example of an approach 
which holds moral statements to be unique from other sorts of statements. It will then be argued 
that this, if it were the case, would be an undesirable outcome; one which the sort of relativism 
defended by this discussion will deny. Work done in 3.1 to demonstrate that a relativist 
approach can allow for moral judgements to have descriptive ‘way-the-world-might-be 
content’ (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 75), will allow the claim that moral judgments are not 
 
21 Of course, as the second chapter of this discussion has sought to demonstrate, relativism does not always lead 
to moral irrealism. However, it is a position which is most often occupied by moral relativists and therefore, moral 
relativism can usually be thought of as a form of moral irrealism – and least with respect to the typical “card 
carrying” relativist laid out in 2.3. 
22 The version of relativism advocated for in this discussion, the expressivism of Horgan & Timmons and the 
particular moral irrealism of Wittgenstein in his Lecture on Ethics. 
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unique to be made. That  is, because they can be considered truth apt relative to some set of 
standards like any sort of judgement that may be made. 
Finally, 3.3 will consider whether the relativist can allow that moral judgements have any sort 
of truth value. Of course, 3.2 will have already established that the relativist can consider moral 
judgements to be truth apt; true or false relative to some set of standards. Therefore, more time 
will be spent considering what this might look like and whether or not a relativistic conception 




3.1 An Irrealist Moral Relativism Contextualised 
One way of understanding relativism which was not emphasized in earlier parts of this 
discussion  is as an available position in contemporary metaethics. As suggested in chapter 
two, there are ways  of thinking about relativism that are more or less worrying than others. 
For example, we may understandably be worried about a realist moral relativism; such a theory 
would share with moral absolutism the idea that there are independent moral truths. A realist 
moral relativism would, of course, stipulate that there are more than one set of these truths, and 
they are determined by cultural context or some other variable factor. If it is not already clear 
why such a theory would be a cause for concern, one need only imagine that it would most 
likely determine that slave ownership was right in the context of the pre-civil war American 
South. Once again, it is hard to imagine that anyone would abide a theory with as thorny an 
implication as this. These arguments have already  been made in the second chapter of this 
discussion, there it was argued that the M.I.R can avoid said implications, due to the fact that 
they can reject absolute truth and make projections about the direction of moral progress. 
This section will focus on relativism, understood as one of a number of available approaches 
to metaethical theories. One other available approach is moral irrealism. Once again, it will be 
argued here that moral irrealism can be combined with relativism and that there are advantages 
to doing so; however, it should be noted that moral irrealism is not inherently relativistic. 
Horgan & Timmons succinctly described moral irrealism as the idea that ‘there are no moral 
properties or relations to which moral terms… might be used to refer and, relatedly, there are 
no moral facts that moral judgements might describe or report’ (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 
75). It must be noted, their project here was an anti-relativist one; this fact leads nicely to the 
suggestion that moral irrealism is implicit in a number of metaethical perspectives other than 
relativism. The perspective defended by Horgan & Timmons is a version of what they call, 
expressivism. 
Expressivism is, in their own words, ‘a metaethical view according to which… a typical moral 
judgment functions to express some psychological state other than a descriptive belief’ (ibid., 
p. 73). This is, again by their own admission, essentially the same as another metaethical view 
known  as noncognitivism; according to Horgan & Timmons, noncognitivism is included in, 
but not limited by their expressivism, but these finer details are not pressing for now. 
Something should first be said about noncognitivism itself. 
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Broadly speaking, moral noncognitivism suggests that we do not know what it is that we are 
saying when we try to make moral statements, for example. The moral noncognitivist holds 
that moral statements are not descriptive, that they do not represent or describe verifiable facts 
about the world. Berit Brogaard can be used to support this view, in her words ‘noncognitivism 
holds that moral statements do not express beliefs or other truth-apt mental states’ (Brogaard, 
2012, p. 548). One form of this theory identified by her is prescriptivism; to use her words 
again, prescriptivism can be traced back to Rudolf Carnap, the prescriptivist ‘holds that moral 
statements are commands’ (ibid.). Another form of noncognitivism identified by Brogaard is 
expressivism – ‘or emotivism, which holds that moral statements express desires, emotions, or 
other affective states’ (ibid.). This  version of noncognitivism was referred to briefly in 2.2; 
there referred to as a “boo-hurrah” theory  of morality. 
There are surely many diverse versions of noncognitivism; seeing that this discussion has set 
out to focus on relativism in particular, not too much time will be spent elaborating their finer 
details. The purpose of drawing attention to noncognitivism here is simply to give a wider 
context to the metaethical perspective of a contemporary card-carrying relativist. It is not 
simply a matter of relativism vs absolutism in metaethical debates, there are many diverse 
perspectives with their own horse in this race. One which has already been mentioned is Horgan 
& Timmons’ expressivism.23 All that said, some time will be spent considering this approach 
as well as moral noncognitivism in a broader sense. 
In order to better understand an irrealist approach to moral thought, it may be helpful to lay out 
what is, arguably, an archetypal example of it. Namely, one version of the early Wittgenstein; 
that  of the Lecture on Ethics. In this short text he… 
A. distinguishes between, what he calls, judgements of absolute value and 
judgements of relative value. 
B. claims that judgements of absolute value are not reducible to, or do not 
correspond to, facts about the world. 
C. suggests that moral statements are judgements of absolute value and are 
therefore meaningless. 
 
23 For the sake of simplicity, the term “expressivism” will be used from this point forward. Its use here will be 
interchangeable with the term “noncognitivism” and so, it may refer either to Horgan & Timmons’ own particular 
brand or, more generally, a more traditional understanding of the latter term. 
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These sentiments, it is fair to say, have a distinctly irrealist flavour. Judgements of absolute 
value can be thought of as non-relativised truth claims; for example, propositions which are 
independent and non-variable. They are the bread and butter, so to speak, of the moral realist 
and Wittgenstein’s declaration that they are meaningless can be seen as a strong expression of 
moral irrealism. 
This claim is perhaps best supported by the “world book” argument Wittgenstein puts forward 
in  the lecture. The argument is as follows… 
‘Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the movements of all 
the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all the states of mind of all human 
beings that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote all he knew in a big book would contain the 
whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing 
that we could call an ethical judgement or anything that would logically imply such a 
judgement’ (Wittgenstein, 2014, p. 2) 
This imaginary book to which Wittgenstein refers is, in Horgan & Timmons’ terminology, a 
kind  of compilation of ‘way-the-world-might-be content’ (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 75). 
An ethical judgement or anything that would imply such a judgement would be, continuing 
with Horgan & Timmons’ terminology, in some other book; a compilation of ‘way-the-world-
ought-to-be content’ (ibid.). One can imagine that Wittgenstein would see the latter as a book 
of nonsense and therefore,  in Wittgenstein’s framework, there would be no reason, in the 
strong sense, to avoid sticking knives into  each other or any action which we generally consider 
ought to be avoided. 
At a surface level, legal stabbings aside, Wittgenstein’s argument is a typically expressivist one 
which, most likely, would be supported by Horgan & Timmons. Some of their arguments are 
directly comparable with those of Wittgenstein. They have, for example, suggested that ‘there 
are  no moral properties or relations to which moral terms (and the concepts they express) might 
be used to refer and, relatedly, there are no moral facts that moral judgments might describe or 
report’ (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 75). New readers of the Lecture would not likely find 
anything out  of place if this excerpt was pasted into that text without their knowing. What 
then, is the difference between Wittgenstein and Horgan & Timmons here? Is it simply that 
Wittgenstein’s position is expressivism which also tends towards some kind of relativism? 
Some of the arguments that have been and will be made here can allow us to say no, that the 
M.I.R can relativise what Wittgenstein  refers to as judgements of absolute value without 
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discarding them completely, so that we may continue to live in a world where sticking knives 
in each other is illegal. 
Although it will be argued that the Wittgenstein of the Lecture on Ethics is not a “card carrying 
relativist” in the mould created by this discussion, traces of relativism can be found outside of 
his conception of judgements of absolute value. Specifically, in his treatment of the term 
“good”. More will be said about this in the pages that follow but first, the two distinct uses of 
the term identified in the Lecture will need to be established. Just as he did in the case of value 
judgements, Wittgenstein distinguishes between the term “good” used in an absolute sense and 
“good” in a relative sense. If, for instance, one were to declare that Ethics, generally speaking, 
is an enquiry into what is good, one could just as easily say that ‘Ethics is the enquiry into what 
is valuable, or,  into what is really important, or… into the meaning of life, or into what makes 
life worth living, or into the right way of living’ (Wittgenstein, 2014, p. 1). Readers will likely 
anticipate then, that “good” here is used in an absolute sense. On the other hand, ‘the word 
good in the relative sense simply means coming up to a certain predetermined standard’ (ibid.). 
Translating this to the terminology used in the first chapter of this discussion, using Haack’s 
scheme demonstrated in Kusch & Baghramian’s tables, it might be said that Wittgenstein’s x, 
his object of relativisation, here is “good” and his y, his domain of relativisation, is “coming 
up to a predetermined standard”. This represents a relativistic conception of moral irrealism 
nicely. 
Now that an overview of the expressivist approach and the relativist approach have been 
detailed, this section is left with the task of answering the question: what are the key differences 
between the relativist perspective and that of expressivism? First, consider one way in which 
they are likely  to be the same. Both card carrying relativists and expressivists would want to 
distance their approaches from that of Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics for at least one key 
reason.  He takes the claim that judgements of absolute value are not reducible to, or do not 
correspond to,  facts about the world and uses it to draw the conclusion that moral statements 
are judgements of absolute value and are therefore meaningless. Meaningless is used in a strong 
sense here, it might  be argued that a moral irrealism would not take moral judgements to be 
meaningless and  Wittgenstein is therefore not any sort of moral irrealist in the first place. This 
would be a fair criticism, perhaps his metaethical perspective could therefore be thought of as 
a kind of hard-line descriptivism. He has specific criteria which a statement must meet in order 
to be verified. If this criterion is not met and a given statement is therefore not deemed to be 
descriptive, it is simply unverifiable, in other words, meaningless. 
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Of course, there are means by which both the relativist and the expressivist may deny this. The 
relativist can do so without too much manoeuvring. There is nothing to say that she cannot 
allow that moral statements are in fact reducible to, or correspond to, facts about the world. 
The Lecture defines the use of “good” in a relative sense by the following example, ‘If… I say 
that this is a good chair this means that the chair serves a certain predetermined purpose and 
the word good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon’ 
(ibid.). Wittgenstein does not do enough to prove that moral statements cannot follow these 
same principles. The relativist can simply say that the claim “not sticking knives in each other 
is good” can be reduced  to something like “the claim that not sticking knives in each other is 
good serves a certain predetermined purpose, that I might be able to go for a walk without 
getting stabbed for example, and good here has only meaning so far as this purpose has been 
previously fixed upon. 
The relativist can, for example, say that z is a good deed; this would mean that the deed fulfils 
a certain predetermined purpose, say to alleviate suffering, and the word good here would only 
have meaning so far as this purpose has been previously fixed upon. This predetermined 
purpose could be culturally contingent, historically contingent or transient in any other way 
whatsoever. Therefore, the relativist can deem moral statements to be descriptive, verifiable 
and so on. They would only need to stipulate that their truth value is contingent upon some 
outside factor; say, the near universal desire to avoid being stabbed. Similarly, it has been 
argued that the expressivist can say no; moral statements are not unverifiable but are rather 
differently verifiable compared to other sorts of statements. 
Now that some similarities between these two metaethical perspectives have been established. 
Wittgenstein’s Lecture may be used again to demonstrate key differences between 
expressivism and relativism. Some typical relativist and expressivist arguments have been 
identified in that text but, as it has been argued, Wittgenstein’s hard-line descriptivism will 
likely alienate many. The term descriptivism here is used to describe the staunch commitment 
to statements which have descriptive intentional content on display in the Lecture; judgements 
of relative value, to use the language from that text. Of course, the metaethical perspective 
could also be conceived of as an ethical nondescriptivism, given his belief that moral statements 
do not have descriptive intentional content. 
With this, Horgan and Timmons would agree. However, to repeat, they would not share the 
sentiment that moral statements are totally meaningless. Their approach is a more moderate, 
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carefully worded version of a somewhat similar line of argument; they contend that moral 
statements express psychological states rather than verifiable facts. In their own words, ‘moral 
judgments express psychological states whose primary role is not representational and hence 
whose intentional contents are not descriptive, way-the-world-might-be contents’ (Horgan & 
Timmons, 2006, p. 75). These psychological states to which they refer are ‘not primarily 
representational’ and are what they call ‘a certain kind of evaluative action-guiding state’ 
(ibid.). Establishing what exactly they mean by this will be outside the scope of this discussion. 
It will be  enough to say that expressivism is a nondescriptivism. 
In contrast, at least some forms of moral relativism can certainly be considered descriptivist 
theories. Relativism is, generally speaking, a truth-positive theory, which seeks not to 
undermine truth value but to widen its scope. The relativist can speak about moral judgements 
in terms of descriptive, way-the-world-might-be contents because they can conceive of them 
as true relative to some set of standards. Even nondescriptivists like Horgan & Timmons, and 
possibly even the Wittgenstein of the Lecture on Ethics, accept that moral judgements can be 
‘properly evaluated as “true” … or “correct” … relative to some set of standards’ (ibid., p. 84). 
This leads nicely to the topic of the next section. Now that a map of relativism within the wider 




3.2 Are Moral Statements Unique? 
This section will take a similar approach to 3.1, in that the Lecture will be used as a kind of 
reference point to which moral relativism can be compared. Readers will likely anticipate how 
some of the arguments made in the Lecture on Ethics can be used here to represent a perspective 
which sees moral statements as unique. That is, unique in the sense that they are not verifiable. 
Readers may also anticipate that there would be some cause for concern if it were the case that 
moral statements were totally meaningless, as Wittgenstein suggests. It will be argued here that 
the moral relativist need not accept this claim. She may firmly deny that moral statements are 
unique in the manner implied by the Lecture, or any other manner whatsoever. This would be 
vital  to any defence of moral relativism for obvious reasons; we all have more than a little 
interest in the preservation of at least some moral statements. There would, for example, be 
few who would be without concern if it were widely accepted that “murder is wrong” is an 
unverifiable proposition. 
The first section of this chapter distilled the main arguments made by Wittgenstein in the 
lecture to A. B. and C. Before going on to criticise their implications, it may be necessary to 
elaborate them a little further. Judgements of relative value, for Wittgenstein, are essentially 
the way-the-world-might-be content that is compiled by his imaginary “world book”. In other 
words,  judgements which are reducible to, or correspond to, facts about the world. Consider 
another example offered by Wittgenstein, he suggests that a statement like “she is a good 
pianist” is reducible to, or corresponds to, the fact that she can ‘play pieces of a certain degree 
of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity’ (Wittgenstein, 2014, p. 1). On the other hand, 
the statement “she  is a good person” cannot be stripped back to such a tangible form. To be a 
good person is to be intrinsically good, rather than good at something. “She is a good person” 
is, of course, a moral claim, which, according to Wittgenstein is a meaningless one. 
This may seem to be somewhat radical – after all, it seems perfectly clear to us what we mean 
when we say that someone is a good person. Usually, that possessing certain traits which we 
deem  to be desirable or that they do not possess certain traits which we deem to be undesirable. 
There is, most likely, some sort of minimum level of adherence to these ideas of ours which 
must be reached in order for us to make this judgement. I might say that anyone who is a good 
person is someone who is kind, charitable, modest, helpful etc. So then, when I say that so and 
so is a good person, I can be seen to be making a judgement of relative value because my 
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proposition can simply be reduced to statements of fact. That they are charitable, modest, 
helpful etc. 
Wittgenstein’s assessment of this statement could be considered something of an 
oversimplification. That she can ‘play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain 
degree  of dexterity’ is not the only fact which might move us to make the statement “she is a 
good pianist”. We might, for example, be moved by the emotions which a pianist stirs in us 
with her playing. We  might also be taken with a pianist’s appreciation of the space between 
notes, at her ability to know  when and when not to play. There are a wide variety of factors 
which might motivate us to arrive  at the judgement “she is a good pianist”; if the only measure 
of success in the art of piano playing  was technical ability, there would certainly be a different 
roster of the most popular pianists. It may be that there is no one statement to which “she is a 
good person” might be reduced but surely  the same can be said of “she is a good pianist”. 
Wittgenstein seems to use the idea that there is no one fact to which the statement “she is a 
good person” may be reduced to support the idea that it is not a judgement of relative value 
unlike other sorts of judgement. However, as we have seen, “she is a good pianist” is a 
statement which can be reduced to any number of different facts. As mentioned above, when 
we judge someone to be a good person, we may be doing so because we have seen them to be 
charitable, modest, helpful etc.  As in the case of the statement “she is a good pianist”, the 
variety of facts to which this statement  may be reduced should do nothing to undermine its 
validity. 
At this point, it may be worth noting that Wittgenstein thought about ethics in a much broader 
sense than merely the practice of formulating moral judgements like those just discussed. He 
considered ethics ‘in a wider sense, in a sense in fact which, amongst other things, includes… 
the  most essential part of what is generally called ‘Aesthetics’ (ibid.). In the lecture, he 
writes… 
‘Instead of saying “Ethics is the enquiry into what is good” I could have said Ethics is the 
enquiry into what is valuable, or into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is 
the enquiry into the meaning of life or into what makes life worth living or into the right way of 
living’ (ibid., p. 5). 
With that said, it may be misleading to suggest that Wittgenstein considered moral judgements 
to  be totally unique. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that he considered any sort of 
judgement pertaining to “the good” to be unique. That is, any sort of moral or aesthetic 
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judgement. This should not do much to stand in the way of what this section will seek to 
convey. 
So then, Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics considers moral, and indeed aesthetic, judgements 
to be uniquely unverifiable. As mentioned briefly in 3.1, expressivists such as Horgan & 
Timmons would suggest that moral statements are not unverifiable but are rather, differently 
verifiable compared to other sorts of statements. Both of these metaethical perspectives can be 
considered as  varying degrees of nondescriptivism. Relativism then might need only to be 
established firmly as a form of descriptivism in order to deny that moral statements are unique. 
Efforts have been made  to achieve this in 3.1, there, it was suggested that the relativist can 
speak about moral judgements  in terms of descriptive, ‘way-the-world-might-be’ (Horgan & 
Timmons, 2006, p. 75) contents because they can conceive of them simply as true relative to 
some set of standards. Once again, it  was argued that the moral statements like “not sticking 
knives in each other is good” can function in the same way as statements, what Wittgenstein 
refers to as judgements of relative value, like “this is a good chair”. In this sense, the M.I.R can 
refer to moral statements as truth apt. 
Similarly, Horgan & Timmons concede that even if their perspective – that ‘moral judgements 
are properly construed as nondescriptive’ – were assumed to be the case, moral judgements can 
‘nevertheless be properly evaluated as “true” (using this term very broadly) or “correct” (if one 
would rather reserve “truth” talk for descriptive judgments) relative to some set of standards’ 
(ibid., p. 84). If one were to travel back in time and interview the Wittgenstein of the Lecture 
on Ethics, one may find that even he would concede this point. He would hardly deny that that 
a moral  judgement such as “murder is wrong” can be properly evaluated as true – or, at least, 
correct – relative to a set of standards. It would, for example, be difficult to deny that this 
judgement is true  in contemporary democracies where the law of the land represents a very 
tangible means by which  it may be verified that “murder is wrong” is a true judgement; more 
on this will follow in 3.3.24 
So then, following this system, the relativist can contend that moral statements are not unique 
in the manner proposed by the Lecture, contemporary expressivists or any other manner 
 
24 It is not the intention here to equate what is moral with what is legal, rather to imply that the law of a given land 
can sometimes be a useful insight to the ethical convictions of its inhabitants. Of course, this will not always be 
an accurate metric. Imagine, for a moment, a more authoritarian society where citizens do not have much say in 
the laws enacted by their government. There, the law of the land would have little to do with what is generally 
considered to be right and/or wrong. Therefore, there is not always a correlation between that which is moral and 
that which is legal. 
56 
 
whatsoever. Relativists can, returning to Wittgenstein’s example of the pianist, contend that 
the claim “she is a good person” functions in the same way that “she is a good pianist” does. 
Each express truth claims which can either be verified or rejected on the basis of their adherence 
to some set of standards, “She is a good person” has intentional contents which are primarily 
descriptive; these intentional contents are just as concrete as those of a statement like “she is a 
good pianist”. 
The relativist can, therefore, strongly argue that – if a judgement that fits the description of 
Wittgenstein’s absolute value exists, moral judgements need not be counted as one of them. 
They are just as verifiable, truth apt etc. as any other judgement of relative value which we may 
be moved to make. 
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3.3 Does Relativism Preclude Truth Value? 
This chapter has thus far considered some features of moral relativism in relation to other 
metaethical theories and argued that it need not align itself with one fundamental element of 
metaethical noncognitivist or expressivist theories. That is, that moral statements are  
fundamentally different to other sorts of statements. This has laid the foundations for the 
question  posed by this section: does moral relativism, due to the fact that it judges moral 
statements to only ever be judgements of relative value, preclude truth value? 
As demonstrated in 3.2, moral relativism labels moral statements “true” relative to some set of 
standards, but is this a robust conception of truth value? 3.2 also suggested that moral 
statements can, in fact, be considered judgements of relative value. It was argued that “she is a 
good person” functions in the same way as “she is a good pianist”, both are reducible to any 
number of facts, depending on the perspective of the speaker or some framework to which the 
speaker is referring. Therefore, we may agree that she is a good pianist, or indeed a good 
person, but disagree about why this is the case 
What would be the outcome if we were to consider a judgement with which hardly anyone 
would  be likely to disagree; for example, “murder is wrong”. There is perhaps no better 
example of an absolutist statement. The following example demonstrates how and why murder 
is wrong by definition. Consider for a moment an imaginary reader, we will call her Jane. Being 
a Christian, Jane if anyone would be an absolutist when it comes to morality. She holds the ten 
commandments  of her religion in high regard; she believes that one should treat their 
neighbour as they would like  to be treated themselves. These bases provide her with firm 
ground on which she may draw the conclusion that stealing is wrong. 
That said, she is also realistic about the complexity of moral dilemmas with which many of us 
are regularly faced. She knows, for example, that the choice between stealing food and going 
hungry  is one such dilemma and that sometimes, the need to survive must take precedent. Jane 
can therefore be convinced that her claim is not entirely absolute; that there are scenarios in 
which stealing may be the right thing to do. She realises that this stands out as an inconsistency 
in her position but hopes at the very least that she herself will never be forced to act in 
contradiction to her beliefs. To borrow Wittgenstein’s terminology, “stealing is wrong” is 
therefore a judgement of relative value. It is one which can be distilled down to other more 
specific judgements. For example, stealing produces such and such bad consequences, 
discouraging the act would produce such and such good consequences and so on. 
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Similarly, even if nowhere else, Jane may find in the tenets of her religion, the ground on which 
to draw the conclusion that killing is wrong. “Thou shalt not kill” is well and good, but her 
moral convictions are just as likely to become more lenient if she is left with no choice but to 
kill an aggressor in order to defend herself or her loved ones. Therefore, using Wittgenstein’s 
phrasing again, “killing is wrong” is perhaps another judgement of relative rather than absolute 
value for her. As in the case of stealing, it is one which can be distilled into other judgements. 
For example, stealing produces such and such bad consequences, discouraging the act would 
be in the interest of everyone. 
So then, Jane can be convinced there are cases in which it may not be wrong to steal or kill; 
that stealing or killing may even be the right thing to do in very specific circumstances, despite 
the fact that they are explicitly prohibited by the commandments of her faith. She can accept 
that these moral prescriptions are not absolute, that defying them in certain circumstances is in 
fact permissible and that doing so would not make her any less of a Christian. Does this mean 
that Jane  is a relativist? 
Well and good you might say, but the previous page set out to tackle the statement “murder is 
wrong”. The notion that killing in self-defence may be permissible will have no effect on this 
proposition; if one were to kill in self-defence, one would not be committing murder. Murder 
is killing with an asterisk and “murder is wrong” is a judgement of absolute value if ever there 
was one. If this can be properly assumed, the Lecture would therefore deem it to be 
meaningless. This  is not a desirable conclusion at which to arrive for obvious reasons, each 
and every one of us has a vested interested in “murder is wrong” being a truth apt statement. 
The question therefore remains, can the moral relativist hold these sorts of statements to be 
truth apt? 
In order to do this, it will need to be shown how it may be that the statement “murder is wrong” 
can be conceived as a judgement of relative value. This may seem to be a difficult task but 
there is certainly a means by which it may be achieved. “Murder is wrong” might be a 
judgement of absolute value but it is perhaps not the most “live” topic of debate when it comes 
to the ways in which the concept of murder operates within our societies. We are all likely to 
agree that murder is wrong, but it is not quite so easy to reach agreement about what constitutes 
murder. The following pages will aim to demonstrate that although “murder is wrong” may be 
a judgement of absolute value, “x constitutes murder” is one of relative value. Also, that the 
latter is the more “live” topic of debate today. 
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Let us reconsider the example of Jane for a moment. Thus far, we have been able to convince 
her that there are cases where killing may be the right thing to do. Despite her religious 
convictions, she can be convinced that “thou shalt not kill” may take a back seat if her loved 
ones were to come  under threat, for example. However, despite this concession, we go on to 
find that there is absolutely no scenario in which she could possibly be convinced that abortion 
may be the right thing to do. She experiences a kind of moral outrage when confronted with 
the issue and is resolute  in her belief that the practice is wrong always and everywhere. Why 
might this be the case? There  are sure to be any number of reasons that might be summoned 
but, for the purposes of this discussion, let us make the following assumption. Jane’s strong 
reaction to abortion, regardless of  what may have first motivated it, can be attributed to the 
fact that she believes abortion to be a form of murder. 
It will not be necessary to delve too deeply into debates surrounding reproductive rights here. 
That said, when Jane gets involved in those discussions, she would be likely to express her 
view through various slogans and arguments which would be ultimately based on the claim 
“abortion constitutes murder”. This can be considered a judgement of relative value simply 
because it is undoubtedly truth apt, hardly anyone would not have something to say about its 
truth or falsity. If it were a judgement of absolute value, following the approach taken in this 
discussion, it could neither be deemed true nor false. Both sides of the debates mentioned above 
would surely hold that it is truth  apt, seeing as both sides wish to impress upon us that A.C.M 
is either true or false.25 Of course, the  claim “murder is wrong” is implied by the proposition 
A.C.M, but this does seem to undermine the potential for “abortion constitutes murder” to be 
judged true or false. An interesting problem has been brought up here, is it therefore the case 
the case that an allegedly meaningless judgement – “murder is wrong” – is presupposed by a 
meaningful one – “abortion constitutes murder”? 
To be clear, “meaningless” and “meaningful” are used in very specific senses above. The first 
judgement is described as meaningless because it is a judgement of absolute value and is, as 
per Wittgenstein’s Lecture, not truth-apt. Similarly, the second judgement is described as 
meaningful because it is a judgement of relative value and is therefore truth-apt. Assuming 
these claims are anything but uncontroversial and more work will therefore need to be done to 
bolster them. Seeing  as it is perhaps the lesser of the two tasks, the latter claim will be defended 
here first. Of course, when this section has referred to A.C.M as a meaningful claim; this is not 
 
25 A.C.M will be used in place of “abortion constitutes murder” from this point forward. 
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placing any positive truth value on the claim itself. What it is doing is identifying in it the 
capacity to be reducible to facts which can then be judged true or false. 
A.C.M can be reduced to statements like “abortion ends life”, “life is valuable”, “ending life 
should  be avoided”, “x reasons are not sufficient to justify ending life”, “aborting a pregnancy 
for x reasons should therefore be unlawful”. These are all factual statements, that is, they are 
all statements which are concerned with what actually is the case. That is not to say that they 
are true  of course; categorising them as such simply allows them to be verified or rejected. 
The ability to  do this makes them inherently truth-apt. This, in turn, allows us to consider them 
to be judgements of relative value. Despite what Jane might say, there are undoubtedly grounds 
on which they may  be rejected. If they were judgements of absolute value, this would not be 
the case. 
What then about the claim M.I.W?26 It was suggested above that this is an example of a 
meaningless statement. Once again, meaningless here is used in a very specific sense. That is, 
in the sense that it is a claim which cannot be reduced to statements of fact about the world. It 
may be a claim which is vital to the preservation of our species, we all have very good reason 
to ensure M.I.W is a claim which continues to be considered meaningful. Nevertheless, we can 
imagine how it may not be the case; would murder even exist if we were not here to talk about 
it? Is there such  a concept in the animal kingdom? Murder is something of a metaphysical 
concept in this sense, it  is not the only way to think about it, however. There is perhaps a way 
in which this seemingly archetypal judgement of absolute value could be relativised. Consider 
for a moment some ways in  which M.I.W might be reduced to statements of fact. 
Perhaps the concept of murder might be included in Wittgenstein’s “world book” if we were 
to reduce it to a statement like “murder is unlawful killing”. Surely the various laws of the land 
in existence today constitute facts; if one were to get on a bus right now, they would know that 
killing the bus driver would land them in jail just as well as they would know that the bus has 
wheels. Still, one can accept these as true without conceding that they will be so always and 
everywhere. One can imagine a time where buses no longer have wheels or where the rule of 
law has broken down such that one would not be convicted of murder if one were to kill the 
driver. This may seem  to be nothing more than a farfetched notion, let us reconsider Jane for 
a moment. 
 
26 M.I.W will henceforth be used in place of “murder is wrong”. 
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Being a citizen of a W.E.I.R.D country, she has had to cope with the fact that her government 
and, most likely, the majority of her fellow citizens reject her claim that A.C.M. She remembers 
a time when her claim was the law of the land and ultimately, she hopes that may be the case 
once again. That is to say, if we are to accept that murder = unlawful killing, Jane’s perspective 
on this issue shows us that someone who seemingly cannot be convinced that her belief is 
anything but absolute  is aware of the fact that it is in some way transient. Have we therefore 
been able to further Jane’s relativism? No, it might be argued, her belief that A.C.M is not 
affected by the law of the land and instead draws its absolute truth value from religious sources, 
for example. But, if this were the case, why would she hope that A.C.M might be written into 
law again? She is, in her campaigning, participating in the system which conceives of murder 
simply as unlawful killing. 
If modern W.E.I.R.D countries can be considered to be on the right path in their assumption 
that murder is simply unlawful killing, rather than any sort of metaphysical concept, this may 
allow for  a way in which the moral relativist can hold that M.I.W might be a true statement. 
Following the parameters laid out by 3.2, it may be suggested that the set of standards to which 
the claim M.I.W  is relative would be the law of the land. Murder need not be considered any 
sort of metaphysical concept if it is simply thought of as killing which is prohibited by law. 
Following this, M.I.W can therefore be properly referred to as true if the set of parameters to 
which that claim is relative is taken to be the law of the land. 
Of course, laws are liable to change; therefore, “x constitutes murder can only ever be a 
judgement  of relative value”. Murder is, when thought of in this sense, a distinctly situated 
concept; the example of abortion shows us that what constitutes murder may not always be the 
case. X.C.M27 will therefore always be a claim that can be properly understood as culturally 
contingent,  historically contingent or relative in any other way whatsoever. The claim M.I.W 
will therefore always be reducible to one key contingent set of parameters, the law of the land. 
This should constitute a means by which M.I.W can be included in Wittgenstein’s “world 
book”. If this were not the case, if X.C.M and M.I.W were judgements of absolute value with 
way-the-world-ought-to-be content, moral progress would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Following the example laid out by this section – it would have been difficult, if not impossible, 
for reproductive rights to have advanced to this point in W.E.I.R.D countries. This is perhaps 
the key factor which makes becoming a card carrying relativist an attractive prospect. If realism 
 
27 “X constitutes murder” will be abbreviated to X.C.M from this point forward. 
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can be seen to stand in the way of moral progress, non-relativist irrealism can be seen to go too 
far to undermine the moral statements we can reasonably make. Whether they might be deemed  
unverifiable in the manner put forward by Wittgenstein’s Lecture or differently viable in the 
manner put forward by Horgan & Timmons, both systems see moral statements as 
nondescriptive  claims. This section has argued that irrealism offers the most solid foundations 
on which moral statements can be built and that M.I.R offers the most robust truth value which 





Proponents of an absolutist conception of moral truth might contend that not enough has been 
done here to debunk their perspective. How is it, they might say, that moral progress has been 
made up  to this point – whilst relativism has remained a minority viewpoint? This would be a 
fair criticism  but pitting the relativist perspective against that of the absolutist was not the goal 
of this discussion. The overarching goal of this project has been to identify a means by which 
moral statements can be deemed truth apt contra absolutism. One key aim of this project has 
been to allow readers to come away with the impression that relativism is an available position 
within moral irrealism. 
The arguments made here have also allowed readers to come away with the impression that 
moral irrealist relativism is a viable position to take up in contemporary metaethical debates. 
Also, that becoming a card carrying relativist in the mould put forward here may even be an 
attractive prospect. At the very least, readers will have come away with a nuanced 
understanding of the many  diverse forms of relativism that exist today; as well as a healthy 
scepticism of attempts to dismiss  relativist perspectives in general or cast the relativist as a 
kind of pantomime villain. This should plant the seed for further development of some versions 
of relativism – if readers are not won over  by that advanced here – being more widely regarded 
as viable stances in contemporary Western philosophy. 
The particular brand of relativism defended by the latter parts of this project does still have the 
potential for further development. Future research into M.I.R could be helped by investigating 
the criticisms of non-relativist moral irrealists like Horgan & Timmons more closely. A 
significant portion of the research carried out here was dedicated to the groundwork necessary 
for defending a relativism and, more specifically, suggesting that becoming a card carrying 
relativist might be an attractive prospect. As stated in the earlier sections of this project, 
significant confusion and controversy has consistently plagued relativism but, of course, not 
all anti-relativists are quite so unnuanced as some of those referenced here. 
The M.I.R position could be strengthened by considering some of the more sophisticated anti-
relativist perspectives – once again, like the expressivism of Horgan & Timmons – in more 
detail.  It could, for example, be investigated whether M.I.R might be properly thought of as 
an available position within descriptivism. This would provide a clear avenue in which the 
moral irrealist relativist could distinguish themselves from other, non-relativist moral irrealists. 
The goal of the latter parts of this project and thereby, the overarching goal of this project, 
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could perhaps have been better achieved if the moral irrealist relativist could have been more 
clearly shown to make available the idea that moral statements can describe ‘way-the-world-
might-be content’ (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 75). 
All that said, one key success of this project has been to show that the relativist can hold moral 
statements to be, referring back to Wittgenstein’s terminology, judgements of relative value. It 
has here been successfully shown that the relativist can translate statements which, at first, 
appear to be judgements of absolute value into more manageable statements. For example, 
“abortion is murder” = “x constitutes murder”; x = abortion. In this manner, moral statements 
can more straight forwardly be considered truth apt and can subsequently be judged true or 
false. 
The stakes are high here; moral realism ought to be avoided. If the moral realist is right and 
moral statements refer to objective features about the world, then the obstacles in the way of 
moral progress are more concrete. Moral irrealism, of course, provides a clear solution to this 
problem; but not just any moral irrealism ought to be accepted. More extreme versions, like 
that of Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics would have us do away with moral statements 
altogether – this would be a mistake. Moral statements allow us to promote desirable 
behaviours and discourage harmful ones. As Prinz argued when considering the idea of moral 
progress in a relativist world, ‘moral values do not become more true, but they can become 
better by other criteria… some sets of values are more conducive to social stability’ (Prinz, 
2011, p. 5) 
Is a desire to reach and maintain social stability not at the heart of all sensible ethical debates? 
Surely, we are not in search of “the good” simply for the sake of it? Free from any attachments 
to  the one set of values or another, we might be able to hone our ideas of right and wrong to 
better promote social stability – to promote the desirable and denounce the harmful. There is 
perhaps no  better reason to support M.I.R, to become a card carrier. Prinz goes on, ‘the 
discovery that relativism is true can help each of us individually by revealing that our values 
are mutable and parochial… these realisations make us more tolerant and more flexible’ (ibid.). 
Perhaps then, we might be able to cut the brakes on moral progress and make ethical 
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